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Abstract 
Even though it is widely recognised that children are the age group most affected by poverty, 
children’s own experiences of living in social and economic hardship are still not well 
incorporated into most poverty reduction strategies and programmes. The purpose of this 
study is to find out how children and families in three rural communities in the southern 
Peruvian Andes experience well-being and poverty, in order to understand what may help 
them to lead the kinds of lives they value instead of following others’ pre-established ideas of 
what is best for them. The study draws on research carried out with 49 children aged 
between 6 and 14, with primary data being collected using a variety of qualitative techniques 
including social mapping, free drawing and child-led photography, as well as interviews with 
children, parents, teachers, healthcare professionals and promoters of Juntos, a social 
protection programme aimed at reducing poverty among very poor families with children 
under the age of 14. Secondary data from a local household survey were also used.  
Findings show that Juntos, like other conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America, 
is ensuring that children under the age of 14 attend school regularly as well as have frequent 
health check-ups. Juntos is also enabling some families to invest in productive activities such 
as animal husbandry or small-scale agriculture. However, one of the major findings of this 
study is in relation to the effects of Juntos on people’s social relations. These include 
relationships within families and communities, as well as people’s relationships with local 
service providers, and their perceptions of the Government in general. These effects on 
relationships have important implications for children, as it is through these social worlds that 
children feel and experience well-being. This collective experience of well-being is relevant to 
programmes like Juntos because, if not considered properly, it may disrupt social relations 
and trust between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of conditional cash transfer 
programmes. 
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1. Introduction 
Evidence from around the world shows that children are the age group most likely to 
experience the effects of poverty (Gordon et al. 2003; UNICEF 2005). This is particularly the 
case in the majority world where it is estimated that over a billion children experience ‘severe 
deprivation of basic human needs’ such as food, safe drinking water, health, education and 
adequate shelter (Gordon et al. 2003: 25). With this in mind, a new generation of 
programmes specifically targeting children from poor households were introduced in Latin 
America mainly during the 1990s. These programmes are social protection measures called 
‘conditional cash transfers’ (CCTs), and have rapidly become a critical component of poverty 
reduction strategies.  
CCTs claim to address short-term income needs as well as to promote ‘longer-term 
accumulation of human capital’ by providing money to families in poverty contingent upon 
certain verifiable actions and behaviours, such as school attendance or basic preventative 
healthcare (de la Brière and Rawlings 2006: abstract). It is also the case that increasing 
family income puts people in a better position to accrue longer-term resources (for example, 
make investments, avoid debt). By linking cash transfers to certain desirable behaviour, 
CCTs highlight the co-responsibility of beneficiaries for their own well-being. This is assumed 
to strengthen social citizenship, with rights and duties shared between authorities and 
citizens (Coady et al. 2004; Cohen and Franco 2006). There is also some political motivation 
to demonstrate to non-recipients that beneficiaries are deserving of the cash transfers. The 
benefits of CCTs for children include improvements in nutrition, school attendance, use of 
health services and birth registration, though there is debate about whether or not it is the 
cash or the conditionality (or indeed the associated development of infrastructure) which 
makes the difference (Devereux 2009). 
Though promising, CCTs may also have important limitations for children. For instance, 
CCTs tend to focus on children as future adults, prioritising their preparation for adult life as 
economically productive citizens. By looking mainly at children’s future skills, these 
programmes may not consider children’s experiences in the here and now, and may not 
consider children as agents with their own experiences of well-being and poverty. When 
children are mentioned in this context, it may be as ‘indicators of progress’ such as numbers 
of immunised children or children attending primary school. Even though some CCTs claim 
to be ‘child-oriented’, they have rarely involved children as partners in their design, 
implementation or evaluation processes. As a result, little is known about the effects of these 
programmes on children’s lives that goes beyond the analysis of school enrolment and 
access to nutrition and healthcare programmes. More importantly, little is known about how 
children and their families view and experience these programmes and related services in 
their everyday lives. The lack of inclusion of children’s views and experiences may 
undermine the impact of CCTs, because children’s views about the programme could 
usefully be sought in order to improve the effectiveness of design, in line with Article 12 of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which gives children the right to participate in 
decisions about matters that affect them (UNCRC 1989).  
This paper explores how a CCT, Juntos, is experienced by children and their families in three 
rural communities in the southern Andes of Peru. The main purpose of the study was to 
explore the everyday effects and implications of a CCT with children and the significant 
people in their lives. The study did not intend to ‘assess’ the impact of Juntos according to 
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predetermined indicators of development or progress. Rather, it analyses the role of Juntos 
and related basic services – i.e. school and health services – in shaping the everyday lives of 
children, and their families and communities. It also explores whether children and families 
felt they had the chance to influence and shape the way services connected to Juntos were 
delivered in their communities. By listening to children’s own views and experiences of CCTs, 
this study provides data that could be used to inform the design and development of social 
protection measures intended to improve children’s lives.  
The analysis draws on data from around 50 children aged 6 to 14 years old who were 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of Juntos, as well as their families and other key 
stakeholders such as local teachers, healthcare staff and Juntos coordinators and community 
promoters. The decision to work with young children from rural areas was influenced by the 
fact that they have rarely been involved in research about their lived experiences of poverty; 
and even less frequently have they been consulted about the implications of specific poverty 
reduction measures. The study followed a case-study design (Yin 1994) and involved a 
range of qualitative methods of data collection, including individual interviews, group 
discussions, mapping exercises and child-led photography. The research was done as part 
of my doctoral work (Streuli 2010), and as a contribution to Young Lives, a 15-year 
longitudinal study of childhood poverty in Ethiopia, India, Peru and Vietnam 
(www.younglives.org.uk).  
The next section of the paper provides background information about the situation of children 
in Peru, as well as the country’s socio-economic and political context. Section 3 provides 
general information about Juntos and discusses the emergence of CCTs as social policy in 
Latin America, focusing on their scope and limitations in relation to children. The fourth 
section describes the research methodology. Section 5 presents the findings, which have 
been organised into five sub-sections: poverty and well-being among Juntos and non-Juntos 
families; implications of Juntos for children’s well-being; effects at the household level; effects 
at the community level; and the approach Juntos takes to welfare. Finally, the paper provides 
recommendations for action and future research.  
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2. Overview of the situation of 
children in Peru  
This section provides the background to the study, reviewing the situation of children in Peru, 
including their health and nutritional status, their schooling, and the situation of working 
children, and looking at the socio-economic and policy background prior to the establishment 
of Juntos. 
2.1 Poverty and children’s well-being  
During the early 2000s, Peru underwent a period of political stability and economic growth 
(INEI 2008). Despite this, almost half of the population still live in poverty, with one in six 
facing extreme poverty (Escobal et al. 2008). Poverty rates only started to fall slightly after 
that – from 49 per cent to 45 per cent between 2004 and 2006 (INEI 2002; World Bank 2005; 
INEI 2006). However, significant differences exist within the population. For example, while 
poverty affects around 37 per cent of the population in Lima, the incidence of poverty in the 
interior of the country is 58 per cent, reaching 72 per cent in rural areas (almost double the 
rate in urban areas). The analysis of poverty by natural regions suggests that the number of 
‘poor’ people in rural areas is not only greater, but that people are also two times more ‘poor’ 
than their counterparts in urban areas (excluding Lima city): 28 per cent against 14 per cent 
(INEI 2006).  
Peru has an estimated population of 28 million, 30 per cent of whom are children under the 
age of 14 (INEI 2007a). According to UNICEF, children are the age group most affected by 
poverty in Peru (UNICEF 2008). In 2004, while 45 per cent of Peru’s total population was 
living in poverty, around 60 per cent of children aged 3 to 16 years old were poor (INEI 
2006). In other words, the poverty rate for children was approximately 15 percentage points 
higher than the poverty rate for the overall population. The situation was even worse in rural 
areas, where an estimated 80 per cent of 3–16-year-olds experienced poverty.  
2.1.1 Health and nutrition 
Even though the mortality rate for children under 5 has gone down by 30 per cent since 
2000, the child mortality rate in rural areas is still almost double that in urban areas. In 
contrast, stunting rates, using height-for-age measures, among children under 5 years old 
have remained almost unchanged since 1996 (in a period of mostly GDP growth) – 
representing 30 per cent of children. Stunting is much worse in rural areas (46 per cent) than 
in urban areas (14 per cent); and affects boys more than girls (33 per cent and 26 per cent, 
respectively). Geographically, all regions with stunting above 40 per cent are clustered in the 
Andes (ENDES 2007). Even though there are a number of food programmes provided by the 
Government such as the Vaso de Leche (Glass of Milk) which is the largest food programme 
 
 
1 INEI defines as ‘poor’ those individuals who living in households whose per capita expenditure levels are below the total 
poverty line, based on the costs of a basic consumption basket including food and non-food items; while the ‘extreme poor’ 
are those individuals in households whose per capita expenditure levels is below the extreme poverty line, which is defined as 
the cost of all items in a basic food basket (INEI 2006: 50). 
2  Based on the analysis of the indicador de brecha de pobreza (poverty gap indicator), which measures the distance between 
the per capita income of the population and the poverty line (INEI 2006). 
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in the country, the evidence so far suggests that some of these programmes do not have a 
nutritional impact on children (see Cortez 2001; Alcázar et al. 2003).  
In terms of children’s access to basic services, the scenario is not very positive either. Only 
seven out of ten children have access to safe water, whereas only five have access to 
improved sanitation services (UNICEF 2004), both of which are essential in supporting child 
growth and development.  
2.1.2 Education  
Although school enrolment is almost universal for primary education, 4 per cent of children of 
school age are still out of the education system, which is equivalent to approximately 145,000 
children (UNICEF 2008). Deficit in coverage lies mainly in pre-school and secondary 
education, mainly in rural areas and among girls and children with disabilities. The other main 
challenges in Peruvian education include school drop-out, absenteeism and grade 
repetition, and more importantly a lack of good-quality schooling, especially in rural areas 
(see for example, Jacoby et al. 1999; Cueto 2004; Cueto et al. 2004; Lavado and Gallegos 
2005). One of the major problems behind this is that the expansion of the school system has 
not been accompanied by an increase in the budget for education, which has remained 
relatively constant during the past 30 years (Escobal et al. 2003; Vasquez 2004). In 1999 the 
World Bank noted that Peru had the highest levels of enrolment while at the same time 
having the lowest per-student funding when compared to 100 other countries (World Bank 
1999).  
As a consequence of the Government’s efforts towards increased enrolment, more children 
are now in school, but many of them are not learning at the expected levels. According to the 
2004 National Evaluation, 58 per cent of sixth grade children had mathematical skills below 
the basic level for their grade; and in the case of communication skills this figure is 60 per 
cent. Differences between urban and rural children are very large: 83 per cent of rural 
children had mathematical skills lower than expected versus 55 per cent of urban children; 
and 86 per cent of rural children had communication skills below the basic level against 56 
per cent of their urban counterparts (UNICEF 2008). These tests demonstrated that most 
students could not identify the main theme in what they read, and found it difficult to relate 
what they read to their own lives (Vexler 2004). In the 2001 international evaluation carried 
out by the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), Peruvian students came 
in the lowest-achieving group, and the country appeared as the one with the largest gap 
between urban and rural students in five tests of reading, mathematics and science when 
compared with other countries with similar levels of GDP (UNESCO 2008).  
Factors that influence school achievement are not only children’s family backgrounds but 
also school characteristics (Cueto 2004; Cueto et al. 2006; Cueto 2007). In Peru, most rural 
schools operate with fewer than three teachers, having students from different grades 
sharing the classroom – also called multigrado (multigrade) schools. Half of these schools 
are unidocentes which means they have one teacher-principal in charge of all students. 
Access to basic services such as electricity, water and sewage in multigrade schools is also 
limited (Montero et al. 2002). On the other hand, schools in urban areas tend to be 
polidocentes completas where each grade has its own classroom (Montero et al. 2001; 2002; 
Ministry of Education 2004).  
 
 
3 By children who have not attained the level required by the end of the school year. This affects poor children 
disproportionately because they are absent more and attend more poorly resourced schools. 
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Another important explanation for the low educational outcomes is the sort of curricular 
confusion that has been identified in government schools. One study found that teachers at 
some point were using up to three different syllabi at the same time (GRADE 2004). 
Moreover, teacher training by the Ministry of Education has been carried out in an 
unorganised and disconnected way (Cuenca 2002). Ethnographic studies also reveal little 
use of educational materials, which is associated with teachers not being prepared to use 
them, and also with the difficulties associated with the materials themselves, especially in the 
context of rural areas (Ames 2002). As a result, teachers have to use their own criteria to 
assess the needs of their students, and in doing so, they transfer their own ideas of learning 
and child development and, therefore, their own pedagogical limitations.  
Despite all this, in-depth qualitative and ethnographic studies carried out with both adults and 
children reveal that education is still considered essential to transform children’s lives and is 
perceived as the ‘greatest’ equaliser as it is often assumed to enable people to find a route 
out of poverty (see for example, Leinaweaver 2008; Crivello 2011; and Collatón 2008). 
Education was seen as ‘a viable way out of poverty’ (Leinaweaver 2008: 62) or as a way of 
‘becoming somebody’ (Crivello 2011). Formal education has also been valued for social 
differentiation (between being literate and illiterate), survival (basic skills to interact with the 
urban world), social mobility and migration, and participation both at public and private levels 
(Collatón 2008). 
However, it is important to bear in mind that ethnographic studies have also found that formal 
education was not always the best solution, especially when it did not take into account the 
complexities of children’s lives (see for example, Trapnell 2003; and Aikman 2002). For some 
children and their families opportunity costs of attending school may also be too high, 
especially in rural areas, and they therefore feel that they will gain more knowledge and learn 
more useful skills at home than at school (Ames 2005).  
2.1.3 Children’s work 
An estimated one out of every four children under 18 years old in Peru is involved in 
economic activities (UNICEF 2004). Almost 21 per cent of Peruvian children combine work 
and schooling, whereas around 5 per cent of children only work. Child work seems to be 
associated with poverty: around 40 per cent of children coming from households classified as 
‘extremely poor’ work, whereas only 20 per cent of those classified as ‘non-poor’ do. The 
highest incidences of child work are found in rural areas, where more than 30 per cent of 5 to 
11-year-olds are already involved in economic activities – against only 4 per cent in urban 
areas (UNICEF 2004).  
Children are not only involved in paid work but they also undertake a range of different work 
activities at home. Domestic chores can be extremely time-consuming, especially in rural 
areas. Domestic tasks and care of young children are almost entirely the responsibility of 
women and girls. In rural areas, children start participating in domestic and economic 
household activities as early as 5 years old (Alarcon 2001; Montero et al. 2001). For children 
aged 5 to 11 years living in rural areas, these tasks include fetching water or wood, food 
preparation, washing dishes and clothes, and in some areas, herding animals. They may 
also help with basic agricultural activities. Most studies showed that typically, both boys and 
girls combined work and school (Alarcon 2001; Montero et al. 2001). Work is a more time-
consuming activity for boys than girls, which leaves boys with less time to do homework 
(Montero et al. 2001). Children aged 12 to 16 years increase their work intensity and gender 
roles become more obvious.  
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2.2 Socio-economic context and policy development  
At the end of the 1980s, Peru experienced one of the worst economic and political crises in its 
history. Inflation peaked at over 7,000 per cent; unemployment rose considerably and the 
proportion of poor households increased (Escobal et al. 2003). During the 1980s and 1990s 
the Peruvian population, in particular those living in rural areas, experienced an internal 
conflict between the Government and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), a terrorist 
communist organisation inspired by Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China. During that time 
Sendero Luminoso imposed a ruthless rule on the rural areas it seized, killing elected officials, 
trade union organisers, peasants, and villagers suspected of siding with the Government. 
Approximately 69,280 people were killed or disappeared at the hands of Sendero Luminoso, 
Government forces, self-defence committees and other guerrilla groups such as the 
Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (CNDDHH 1997; CVR 2003). Apart from the 
killings, there were around 600,000 internally displaced people between 1983 and 1991.  
During this period, the country went through a period of economic adjustment and structural 
reforms including trade liberalisation and increased flexibility in the labour market. High 
inequality was and remains a considerable concern and as part of the adjustment 
programme, a number of social programmes were implemented to help the most vulnerable 
sections of the population to bear the transition (Cueto et al. 2011). During this period, the 
internal conflict was also virtually over (CVR 2003). Between 2001 and 2006, important 
measures were taken to tackle poverty in general, and to improve the situation of children. 
Examples of these include the development and implementation of: (i) a Plan Nacional de 
Acción por la Infancia y la Adolescencia 2002–2010 (National Plan of Action for Childhood 
and Adolescence) which is based on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC 1989) and sets out the strategic priorities of the Peruvian Government with 
regard to its actions for children (PNAIA 2002); (ii) a new Ley General de Educación (General 
Law of Education, 2003) that includes pre-school education as part of basic education, thus 
making it free and compulsory; (iii) a Plan Nacional de Educación Para Todos (National Plan 
of Education for All, 2004) approved following the international agreements at Jomtien and 
Dakar; and (iv) a Proyecto Nacional de Educación 2006–2021 (National Education Project) 
which identifies issues of equity and quality as major challenges to Peru’s education system, 
among other things.  
In relation to poverty alleviation measures, there are two major initiatives: the Acuerdo 
Nacional (National Agreement) and the Mesa de Concertación de Lucha Contra la Pobreza 
(MCLCP, the Round Table for the Fight against Poverty). The Acuerdo Nacional was signed 
in 2002 as a long-term plan for the economic and social development of Peru agreed by 
political parties and civil society organisations. It has 31 long-term state policies planned until 
2022, seven of which are specifically aimed at children (Government of Peru 2002). The 
MCLCP is a multi-sectoral, government–civil-society forum aimed at facilitating dialogue and 
participation in public policies on poverty reduction. 
In 2005, the Government of Alejandro Toledo implemented the Programa Nacional de Apoyo 
Directo a los Más Pobres (National Programme of Direct Support to the Poorest), a CCT 
known as Juntos (‘Together’), which was continued and expanded by Alan Garcia’s 
Government (2006–2011). Under this programme, eligible households receive a fixed 
monthly cash transfer of 100 nuevos soles per month which is conditional on their 
compliance with accessing basic healthcare and primary education services for their children 
(Juntos 2007). Initially, the programme was targeted specifically at ‘poor’ households which 
had children under the age of 14, with the purpose of supporting them to invest more in their 
human capital – i.e. through education, nutrition and healthcare – and thereby break the 
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cycle of poverty in the long term. In 2010, Juntos started a new phase and some of its 
activities may face important changes. More information is provided in the next section. 
3. Juntos: a conditional cash 
transfer  
Juntos, like other CCTs, is a programme aimed at poverty reduction. These programmes 
offer cash to ‘poor’ people, with conditions requiring families to invest in their children through 
greater participation in education and health services (de la Brière and Rawlings 2006). Cash 
transfers are becoming increasingly common in majority world countries as a tool to tackle 
childhood poverty (Barrientos and DeJong 2004; Marcus 2004). In the last two decades, 
several Latin American countries have instituted CCTs, granting cash transfers to families 
based on participation in education and healthcare services. The first ones were Mexico’s 
Progresa (Progress), later renamed Oportunidades – Opportunities) and Bolsa Familia 
(Family Purse) in Brazil, which were implemented in the second half of the 1990s.  
This rising interest in CCTs in the region stemmed from positive results reached by early 
evaluations which emphasised their efficiency and effectiveness in improving educational 
outcomes (Morley and Coady 2003; Valencia 2008). For example, a first round of evaluations 
made in Brazil, Nicaragua, Mexico and Colombia, found that CCTs were ‘administratively 
efficient’ and offered ‘effective means’ for promoting the accumulation of human capital in poor 
households (Rawlings 2004). Further evaluations carried out between 1997 and 2003 in Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Brazil, Nicaragua, Mexico and Colombia suggested that cash 
transfer programmes were ‘very effective tools’ for reducing poverty and inequality ‘in the long 
term’ and for the relief of poverty ‘in the short term’ (Bouillon and Tejerina 2006; Valencia 
2008). Consequently, CCTs became valued among politicians, academics and consultants 
close to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank. However, this favourable view may be due to the fact that CCTs are seen 
as a relatively cost-effective solution and one which emphasises behaviour as well as structural 
conditions. Effective social protection is long term and expensive, and there are (for example) 
other mechanisms, especially child benefit, that tend to be ignored but have great potential. 
Further, while there is evidence of positive effects of CCTs on rates of use of formal education 
and healthcare, this can be overplayed as parents may have used these anyway because 
services have improved or there is increased publicity about the importance of using them.  
The following sections describe CCTs in more detail, summarise evaluations of CCTs, and 
then focus specifically on Juntos. 
3.1 What can CCTs offer?  
In relation to CCTs’ specific outcomes for children, their families and communities, evaluation 
studies carried out so far have demonstrated diverse results, as discussed below. 
3.1.1 Education 
Most evaluations of CCTs conclude that they are successful in increasing school enrolment 
and attendance. For example, in Bangladesh children participating in the Food for Education 
programme (now reoriented and renamed Cash for Education) had higher enrolment rates, 
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and stayed in school between six months and two years longer than non-participating children 
(Arends-Kuenning and Amin 2000; Marcus 2004). The programme also had a positive effect 
on girls’ progress to secondary school and in turn this appeared to help prevent girls from 
getting married before the age of 18. The effect on boys was less impressive; they were more 
likely to leave school to do paid work (Arends-Kuenning and Amin 2000).  
Similarly, Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico reduced drop-out rates and facilitated 
progression through grades, particularly the transition from primary to secondary school 
(Behrman et al. 2001; Attanasio et al. 2005a). Progresa’s impact was also greater for girls 
than for boys, which is consistent with the design of the programme, as it provided higher 
grants to girls than to boys (Schultz 2000; Gertler 2005). The programme also protected 
children from so-called ‘shocks’ or adverse events such as unemployment, illness of the 
household head, agricultural and natural disasters, and helped keep them in school (de 
Janvry et al. 2004; Gertler 2005). In Colombia, Familias en Acción (Families in Action) was 
effective at increasing enrolment, particularly among 14–17-year-olds, in both urban and rural 
areas. In this case, boys benefited more than girls. Younger age groups saw very modest 
increases in enrolment, but this was largely due to the fact that initial attendance rates 
among these groups were already relatively high (Attanasio et al. 2005b). 
Results are less promising in relation to effects on actual learning. Most CCT studies do not 
report positive results on this matter (Behrman et al. 2000; Draibe 2006; Levy and Rodríguez 
2005; Ponce 2006; Reimers et al. 2006). In fact, improving the quality of education is not an 
objective of most CCT programmes. Instead CCTs focus more on enrolment and attendance 
rates and therefore, concerns about learning and the quality of education tend to be ignored 
in programme evaluations (Valencia 2008). Also, CCT evaluations do not provide much 
information about what happens to children while they are in school; that is, how do they 
experience schooling and education? What happens after they finish school? Do they feel 
they have acquired what is needed to pursue the kind of life they value the most? These and 
other related questions tend not to be addressed. 
3.1.2 Health and nutrition 
Evaluations of CCTs in Latin America suggest a positive impact on infant preventative 
healthcare – including increased attendance at check-ups during pregnancy and after birth, 
and early in childhood, higher vaccination rates – and lower rates of illness (Villatoro 2005b). 
Some cases also report a reduction in maternal and infant mortality and better health-related 
knowledge among participants. Results with regard to nutrition are mixed (see studies in 
Valencia 2008). Most studies show improvements in the variety of food consumed, greater 
height and weight among participating children, and reduced malnutrition in CCT families. 
However, most evaluations could not find improvements in relation to anaemia, which is a 
serious concern because iron deficiencies can undermine cognitive development and 
therefore affect children’s learning and a country’s long-term human capital formation.  
A recent systematic review of CCTs in low- and middle-income countries, including 
programmes in Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Malawi, Mexico and Nicaragua, concluded that 
the evidence is reasonably consistent about the effects of CCTs on health-related behaviours 
and, to some extent, outcomes (see Lagarde et al. 2007 for detailed findings of the studies 
included in the review). These programmes are successful in increasing the use of health 
services, including immunisation coverage, and improving nutritional and anthropometric 
outcomes. However, the authors also warn that the overall effect on health status remains 
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less clear, and highlight the importance of focusing also on the supply of adequate and 
effective health services.  
3.1.3 Child work 
Another interesting strand of studies has looked at CCTs and their impact on child work. The 
evidence in this area is less clear. Some studies suggest that the impact of programmes 
such as Bolsa Escola in Brazil and Progresa/Oportunidades in reducing child work was 
limited (Sedlacek 2003). These programmes were more effective in keeping children at 
school. Even though Progresa seems to reduce the participation of boys and girls in work 
activities, including domestic work, most of them continue combining work and studies 
(Skoufias and Parker 2001). The effect of Food for Education in Bangladesh on child labour 
was even more ambiguous. The cash transfer increased schooling far more than it reduced 
child labour. Also, it seems that work may well displace time for leisure, homework or 
attending after-school tutorials. The extra time at school may come out of these activities 
instead of work, although more research is needed in this area (Ravaillon and Wodon 2000). 
A review of three CCTs in Bogotá, Colombia found that transfers conditional on education 
can in fact cause a reallocation of responsibilities within the household. Siblings, girls in 
particular, of students who received the subsidy worked more and attended school less than 
students in families that received no subsidy (Barrera-Osorio et al. 2008).  
3.1.4 Poverty reduction 
Most CCT evaluations suggest that the effects of these programmes are greater in reducing 
the intensity than the incidence of poverty (see Valencia 2008). This means that cash 
transfers are effective in bridging the gap between a household’s income and the poverty line 
but generally do not lift households above this line (see Draibe 2006; Cortés et al. 2007 cited 
in Valencia 2008), though they may reduce the depth of poverty. Qualitative studies of 
Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico also confirmed that although the programme did reduce 
the economic vulnerability of households, the reduction was not enough to do away with 
deprivation or ‘eradicate poverty’ (González de la Rocha 2006).  
3.1.5 Social relations 
Evaluations of the effect of CCTs on social relations outside the home or in the community 
are also mixed (see Valencia 2008). Some argue that beneficiaries strengthen network ties 
as a result of their involvement in a CCT programme and that they are ‘empowered’ by the 
cash transfers. On the other hand, others report tension and conflicts between beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries as a result of the targeting methods and inclusion/exclusion criteria 
used, although this is a common problem with targeted programmes.  
For example, Adato (2007) found that participation in communal activities and meetings with 
promoters strengthened social relations in communities. Similarly, in Ecuador a study found 
that women developed new relationships with each other when they travelled to cities together 
to withdraw the cash transfers (Armas Dávila 2004). Women also formed new ties through 
their participation in training workshops, meetings with promoters and other activities in 
Colombia (Villatoro 2005b, Núñez and Cuesta 2006) and Argentina (Kessler and Roggi 2005). 
In contrast, some studies found social tensions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, 
as in the case of Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social (Social Protection Safety Net) (Adato 
2007). In this case, most people in the study communities felt everyone was poor and did not 
perceive the economic differences defined by the targeting system, which created a sort of 
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resentment among those who were not included in the programme. CCTs could also generate 
so-called ‘moral hazards’ which consist of situations in which the provision of cash transfers, 
leads to a dysfunctional change in the behaviour of beneficiaries or potential beneficiaries. For 
example, households might reduce their savings or take fewer risk-preventive measures, in 
the expectation of qualifying for a cash transfer (Barrientos and DeJong 2004).  
3.1.6 Gender relations 
Findings with respect to the influence of CCT programmes on gender relations are also 
mixed. It is usually women who are required to meet the conditions. Early evaluations of 
CCTs confirmed that women were instrumental in the programmes’ success (Skoufias et al. 
2001), and that conditional transfers gave mothers an ‘effective commitment device’ with 
which to defend the welfare of children (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006). Evidence suggests 
that cash transfers targeted at women may have equalising impacts on bargaining power 
within the household because they provide an independent income for mothers (Barrientos 
and DeJong 2004), and may have stronger impact on the living standards of children, 
particularly girls (Haddad et al. 1997). Also, the increased bargaining power within the 
household afforded CCTs may raise the self-esteem of beneficiary women. 
However, other studies suggest that the way most CCTs are designed and implemented 
simply reinforces traditional divisions of labour by confining women strictly to domestic 
chores (Molyneux 2007; Cohen and Franco 2006; García Falconi 2004). These programmes 
may reinforce traditional gender roles by viewing women as key carers and responsible for 
the well-being of other family members.  
3.2 Major challenges to CCTs  
One of the most important questions regarding CCTs is their assumption that in raising the 
income of families, the standard of living of children in these households will also improve 
(Barrientos and DeJong 2004). The impact of cash transfers on poverty among children, 
however, depends on the response of the family and the possible inequalities in the 
allocation of resources within the household.  
Evidence also suggests that the conditionality of cash transfers may create some ‘perverse 
outcomes’ as it may penalise the very households which are in most need of support 
(Barrientos and DeJong 2004: 28). For example, in the first phase of Nicaragua’s Red de 
Protección Social, one of the conditions was that children gain weight, and if they twice fell 
below an established rate of weight gain, parents could be sanctioned by having benefits 
suspended (Adato 2007).  
Other arguments against CCTs relate to the theoretical approach behind their design. Most 
CCTs, including Juntos, are based on the World Bank’s Social Risk Management approach 
which advocates a collection of public measures intended to assist individuals, households 
and communities in managing risks in order to reduce their vulnerability and improve their 
consumption while they continue to contribute to economic development (Holzmann and 
Jørgensen 1999). Even though the Social Risk Management approach is widely used in the 
majority world, some authors argue that this should not be accepted as the ‘truth about social 
protection’ because it reflects a limited conceptualisation of vulnerability, does not explicitly 
address chronic poverty and encourages a limited role for government in social protection 
provision (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004: 6).  
CCTs have also been challenged for being more concerned with providing economic support 
against economic risks and shocks than with other social risks and non-economic 
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vulnerability, such as social exclusion, discrimination, and violations of human rights 
(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). This is an important gap in relation to poverty 
reduction initiatives, especially if we consider that poverty is about social exclusion and 
deprivation as well as economic hardship.  
In a similar vein, a series of studies of the welfare reform of the late 1990s in Britain and the 
United States warn about the risks of introducing a so-called ‘conditional welfare’ system 
(Dwyer 1998; Munger 2003; Dwyer 2004; Scanlon 2005) which, to some extent, is followed 
by most CCTs. Both countries have seen a change from welfare rights to conditional 
entitlements under the assumption that people should be more responsible for their own well-
being and should also make contributions to wider society. Under this new approach to 
welfare, citizenship is centred on notions of duty rather than rights, and individuals are seen 
as responsible for their own welfare (Dwyer 1998). According to the principle of conditionality, 
eligibility to certain basic welfare entitlements should be dependent on an individual first 
agreeing to carry out particular duties or adopt certain patterns of behaviour (Deacon 1994). 
This approach has been criticised for enabling governments and service providers to exclude 
certain citizens from welfare provisions (Dwyer 1998). According to Dwyer, under this 
approach it is not the welfare system that is changing but ‘the welfare rights of the poor that 
are being redefined’ (Dwyer 1998: 513), and for this reason, these changes may have the 
greatest negative impact on those most in need of a set of extensive, guaranteed social and 
economic rights (Dwyer 2004).  
Studies in the United States illustrate some of the effects of conditionality-based programmes 
upon welfare recipients. These include recipients dealing with contradictory cultural 
messages within the welfare system; experiencing surveillance and discipline as a vital part 
of their relationship with welfare providers; confronting the narrow visions of themselves the 
Government has; and accepting how ‘others’ want them to live, among other things (Gilliom 
2001; Hays 2003). Conditional systems are inherently complicated (because of the need to 
judge whether people have met the conditions), and can create some perversities, and they 
can also be stigmatising. The studies cited here offer only a few examples of ‘unintended’ 
consequences of programmes based on conditionality, and are included because of their 
relevance in understanding the implications of Juntos for the lives of children and families 
described in later in this paper.  
In summary, there are a range of experiences of CCTs globally, with positive and negative 
aspects having been reported. The next section focuses on the background and 
development of Juntos. 
3.3 An overview of Juntos 
Similar to other CCTs in the region, the main purpose of Juntos is to build capacities of future 
generations and break the intergenerational transmission of poverty by promoting universal 
access to education for 6–14-year-olds, providing health services (in the form of health 
checks with vaccinations, iron and Vitamin A supplements provided for children under 5), and 
giving ‘poor’ families economic incentives to use them (Juntos 2008: 2). The programme 
claims to follow a basic rights approach, although there is no clear explanation of what this 
means in practice, and seeks to promote the full participation of beneficiaries, and oversight 
of community members (Juntos 2008: 2).  
Juntos was designed to be distinct from other social programmes that offered cash transfers 
without conditions, and those that were limited to issues of food security and connecting poor 
families with the economy (Francke and Mendoza 2007). Up to the time of my fieldwork, 
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Juntos provided a monthly cash transfer of 100 nuevos soles to eligible households, which 
was approximately equal to the average monthly income per capita for families living in 
extreme poverty (20 per cent of the liable national minimum wage per capita) (Francke and 
Mendoza 2007). The amount was the same regardless of the number of children eligible 
families had, and was targeted specifically at ‘poor’ households who had children under the 
age of 14. 
The cash transfer was mainly given to mothers, but could be extended to widowers, 
grandparents and guardians. In order to receive it, beneficiary families had to enrol their 
children in school, make sure they attended regularly (at least 85 per cent of the school 
year), ensure they got all their vaccinations and take them to regular healthcare check-ups 
(these included monitoring of weight and height, vaccinations, iron and Vitamin A 
supplements). Pregnant women had to take part in both antenatal and postnatal care 
programmes, and in addition, adults in the household had to have national identification 
cards and make sure their children had birth certificates.  
As long as they complied with the above conditions, families were eligible to receive the cash 
transfer for up to eight years; the full 100 nuevos soles a month during the first four years, 
and a reduced amount in the second four years, although this was under review. The cash 
transfer was suspended for three consecutive months in the case of non-compliance with the 
conditions and indefinitely if non-compliance was repeated. Every three months, Juntos local 
coordinators visited the homes of beneficiaries to monitor their compliance, and that 
information was cross-checked with school attendance and healthcare visit records. In 2007, 
95 per cent of beneficiary families were reported to have complied with what were called 
‘health-related’ conditions, 97 per cent ensured their children attend school regularly, and 99 
per cent participated in the National Nutritional Assistance Programme package for children 
under the age of 3 (Juntos 2008).  
During its pilot phase in 2005, Juntos served 110 of the poorest districts in five regions in 
Peru, and by 2008 it had reached 638 of the poorest districts in 14 regions, benefiting a total 
of 448,787 family households. Targeting beneficiaries was a challenge, given the frequent 
and profound income fluctuations often experienced by the ‘extremely poor’. Juntos first 
targeted specific regions and districts as ‘priorities’, based on the following criteria: presence 
of extreme poverty and inequality, chronic malnutrition, unmet basic needs, and high level of 
political violence. These variables came in part from the Mapa de Pobreza (Poverty Map) 
and the outcomes from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Initially, the programme 
was seen as a way to tackle the particular vulnerability of populations who were the most 
affected by the political violence that was prevalent in the country between 1980 and 2000. 
Juntos is, in fact, the only CCT programme in the world which used a history of political 
violence as a regional targeting criterion, in part to offer reparations to the victims of political 
violence (Francke and Mendoza 2007).  
The second targeting stage was at the household level and involved a census of households 
in the selected districts using a socio-demographic questionnaire designed and implemented 
by the Peruvian national statistics agency, INEI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e 
Informática). The INEI then measures the probability of a household being poor as a function 
of several easily observable variables such as conditions of living, access to public services, 
and household composition (Francke and Mendoza 2007). Finally, a community validation 
process takes place, whereby community and local authorities are brought together, along 
with representatives from health and education services, to ensure that the provisional list of 
beneficiaries reflects the realities of poverty in the locality. In the community validation 
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process, families had the chance to say if they felt they (or others in the community) had 
been wrongly included or excluded.  
Juntos also claimed to offer a gendered understanding of vulnerability by directing cash 
transfers through women as they have generally been seen as more responsible than men in 
making decisions in the best interests of the entire family (Juntos 2007; 2008). The 
programme was also intended to help change family dynamics from a traditionally male-
dominated structure toward greater familial equality (Francke and Mendoza 2007). 
Specifically, Juntos sought to improve women’s bargaining power within the household by 
reducing their economic dependence and providing them with an independent financial 
resource. 
3.4 Strengths and limitations of Juntos  
At the time of the fieldwork (2007–8), Juntos was still relatively new, and for this reason the 
availability of evidence about its performance and implications were limited. First, a 
theoretical exercise using an econometric model suggested that a CCT with an educational 
component – similar to Juntos – could have positive impacts on school attendance and child 
work in rural areas (Cancho Diez 2006).  
In 2006, qualitative research into the development and implementation of Juntos was carried 
out, involving documentary analysis, key informant interviews and focus group discussions 
with non-Young-Lives families and children in Ayacucho, the first region in which the pilot 
phase of the programme was implemented (Jones et al. 2007; 2008). In 2008, the Consorcio 
de Investigación Económica y Social (Economic and Social Research Consortium) and 
CARE Peru commissioned two studies which looked at the implementation and performance 
of Juntos in the regions of Huancavelica, Andahuaylas and Huánuco (see Trivelli et al. 2009; 
and Vargas and Salazar 2009). These studies involved adults, and focused on the everyday 
management and delivery of Juntos and related services, as well as on people’s perceptions, 
expectations and experiences of the programme. In the same year, another qualitative study 
was carried out in selected districts in Amazonas, Apurímac and Ayacucho by the Instituto de 
Estudios Peruanos (Institute of Peruvian Studies) with the technical and financial support of 
UNICEF and UNDP (IEP 2009).  
The findings suggest that the cash transfers were perceived by beneficiaries as significant for 
their household income, but the studies also highlight the need to evaluate the cap for the 
cash allocated to each family, and to consider the implementation of differential cash 
transfers for families with different characteristics – e.g. those with larger numbers of 
children, or for older and younger children, boys and girls, etc. (Jones et al 2007; 2008; 
Trivelli et al. 2009; and Vargas and Salazar 2009; IEP 2009).  
The impacts on education were not straightforward. The evidence suggests that there was a 
more positive attitude towards education after the programme was implemented, and as a 
result more children were rejoining school (IEP 2009) and fewer dropping out (Jones et al. 
2007; 2008). In some cases there was also an increasing parental involvement in children’s 
education (Jones et al. 2007; 2008), and more beneficiary families could afford to pay for 
their children’s school uniforms and materials (IEP 2009). However, in most cases, changes 
in relation to school enrolment and attendance rates were less evident (Trivelli et al. 2009; 
Vargas and Salazar 2009). Also, Juntos seems to have had an impact on teacher 
absenteeism. The need for teachers and school principals to rigorously monitor school 
attendance has in turn indirectly exerted pressure to reduce teacher absenteeism (Jones et 
al. 2008; IEP 2009). 
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The above studies also found an increase in the use of health services among women and 
children. For example, Jones et al. (2007; 2008) found that between 2005 and 2006 there 
was a 200 per cent increase in health clinic visits for beneficiary children, and a 30 per cent 
increase in vaccinations in the two locations where their study took place. They also 
observed a 65 per cent increase in antenatal and postnatal visits, and a reduction in home 
births among beneficiary women – a policy priority given the high levels of maternal mortality 
in the area.  
In terms of nutrition, interviews with beneficiary families suggest that they were starting to 
consume foods with higher nutritional value, such as eggs, meat, fish, fruit and milk (Jones et 
al. 2007; Vargas and Salazar 2009; Trivelli et al. 2009). However, in most cases the extent to 
which these foods reached children in the family remained unclear. In fact, there is not 
enough evidence from these studies to suggest that there was any impact on children’s 
nutritional status (i.e. reductions in chronic malnutrition or stunting).  
All studies highlighted the need for better-quality services. As we know, an increase in 
service demand without allocating more human and material resources may generate 
problems such as over-saturation and low-quality services. For example, in this case, in 
some communities, beneficiaries complained about long waiting times in the healthcare 
centres, as well as being mistreated and discriminated against by members of the staff 
(Trivelli et al. 2009; and Vargas and Salazar 2009). Some women also claimed that they 
were fined by healthcare staff for missing appointments, among other things (IEP 2009).  
Another important finding is in relation to the targeting process and selection of participants, 
which in most cases generated tensions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. For 
example, the evidence suggests that weaknesses in the household targeting approach and 
community validation process generated adverse effects on community dynamics both 
among adults and children (see for example, Jones et al. 2007; IEP 2009). Preliminary 
findings also suggest that the relationship between beneficiaries and the authorities 
established through the conditionality agreement was to some extent paternalistic and had 
the risk of infantilising rural women. In particular, Jones et al. recommended that the extent to 
which programme officials were imposing their own conceptions and conditions of ‘good 
parenting’ and ‘housekeeping’ should be monitored (2007: 17). 
In relation to the gender dimensions of Juntos, the evidence available is quite mixed. For 
example, Jones et al. (2007) suggest that women were benefiting from greater access to 
healthcare, and enjoying greater autonomy in the home because they controlled the income 
received through the transfers. The authors claim that because women received the 
transfers, they were beginning to wield economic power in their relationships, and some men, 
in fact, were starting to participate more in domestic chores and child-rearing. This, however, 
was less evident in Vargas and Salazar’s (2009) study. While they also found indications of a 
reduction in domestic violence, the process of decision-making in the household was unclear. 
They observed that the distribution of work in the household remained unchanged, with men 
going out to ‘work’ and women staying at home to do the housework and take care of the 
children. However, what they considered important was that women were getting their 
identity documents, which entitled them to access basic services where they could obtain 
more information about their rights and the services available to them. 
Since my fieldwork, some further studies have been undertaken. Quantitative analysis 
carried out by the World Bank (Perova and Vakis 2009) is the first impact evaluation of the 
first two years of Juntos. Using non-experimental evaluation techniques, the study suggests 
that Juntos had a moderate impact in reducing poverty and increasing both income and 
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consumption. Similar to other programmes in the region, Juntos increased the use of health 
services for both children and women, and improved the nutritional intake of beneficiary 
households. In terms of education, it had impacts mainly at transition points, ensuring that 
children entered and finished primary school – which is typical for CCT contexts where 
primary school attendance was already high.  
As with the qualitative studies discussed above, Perova and Vakis (2009) did not find positive 
impacts on child malnutrition or anaemia. Interestingly, the study found that children from 
Juntos households were more likely to have worked in the previous week, according to data 
from the 2006 national household survey ENAHO (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares). (This is 
discussed in more detail below.) Another interesting point is that participation in Juntos also 
induced beneficiary households to spend more on educational supplies. For example, among 
households with at least one child aged between 6 and 14 years, an increase of 
approximately 30 nuevos soles a year in spending on uniforms can be attributed to 
participation in the programme. Juntos, however, does not seem to affect spending on other 
types of supplies such as books.  
Research has also been conducted by Overseas Development Institute as part of an eight-
country study carried out across Africa, Asia and Latin America. This aims to generate 
lessons from existing programmes that address economic and social risks and gender 
inequalities in order to inform emerging social protection programmes and policies (see 
Vargas 2010). Part of the study was carried out in Ayacucho using qualitative approaches, 
including life histories and group discussions with female and male programme beneficiaries. 
Although Juntos was not designed explicitly to promote women’s ‘empowerment’, Vargas 
(2010) suggests that because the cash transfer is directed at women, they are more involved 
in household decision-making, and this is improving their self-esteem and recognition. The 
study also highlights the importance of Juntos in enabling a greater number of women to 
access preventive healthcare, as well as information on sexual and reproductive health. At 
the same time, the findings call for the need to reflect on the traditional approach of Juntos to 
family roles and dynamics in order to promote a more equal distribution of care work and 
gender relations within the household. 
In summary, an increasing body of work is beginning to shed light on the consequences and 
implications of Juntos. However, there is a dearth of research that has explored how children 
themselves experience the conditions attached to Juntos. 
4. The research  
My study followed a qualitative design with a phenomenological approach, focusing ‘on the 
subjective experience of the individuals studied’ (Robson 2002: 195). A qualitative design 
was chosen because it considers social realities as multiple and people as active agents 
defining, and potentially transforming, these realities. Such an orientation supports the idea 
that children can experience poverty and well-being differently than adults; and provides the 
flexibility needed to respond to changing contexts and emergent findings as these arise, 
which is crucial when carrying out research with children. At the time of the fieldwork (2008) 
 
 
4  Here is important to mention that ENAHO only has one question on child work, and does not allow for distinction between paid 
work and household chores. 
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there was little information available about Juntos coverage and its implications for the lives 
of families in the selected research sites. For this reason, a flexible design was necessary to 
allow the development of research questions and conceptual framework, and the collection 
and analysis of data to occur more or less simultaneously, each influencing all of the others.  
4.1 Sample and sampling 
A multistage sampling design was used for the study. First, I looked for Young Lives sites 
that were also covered by Juntos. At the time of the research, this overlap existed for four 
Young Lives sites, one of which was immediately discarded because at that time Young 
Lives household surveys did not include specific questions on Juntos because the 
programme had not been implemented when Round 2 of the survey took place in 2006. Two 
other sites were also omitted because of reported increasing social tensions among families 
in the area. In the end, Huamanga, a province in the Ayacucho region, in the south central 
Sierra of the Peruvian Andes was selected because of its high levels of poverty.  
A second stage of sampling was conducted to select specific communities within Huamanga. 
Young Lives undertakes research in 23 rural communities in Huamanga, reaching a total of 
108 children born in 2000–1, hereafter referred to as ‘the Younger Cohort’, and 24 children 
born in 1994–5 (the Older Cohort). Preliminary information about children and their families 
was obtained from the Young Lives 2006 Household Questionnaire for Caregivers in 
Huamanga. A total of 79 Young Lives Younger Cohort children were identified as 
beneficiaries of Juntos and 29 as non-beneficiaries in Huamanga. Based on that information, 
the following communities were pre-selected: Alamo, Tara and Vilcas. These communities 
were chosen because of their high numbers of Young Lives Younger Cohort children living in 
the same location, whereas in other communities children were scattered over a wide area, 
making it difficult to conduct group-based qualitative research with them.  
A third stage in the sampling process was to approach children and their families on a 
random basis, until an ideal sample of around 20–30 children had been attained, balancing 
factors such as gender, age, household poverty level, location, and participation in Juntos. 
Wherever participant children had older siblings aged 9 to 14 years old (age limit for Juntos 
beneficiaries at that time), these were also invited to take part in group interviews. The 
purpose of including older siblings was to provide alternative and complementary information 
on the (potentially different) effects of poverty and the role of Juntos on different children 
within a given family household. Children’s parents also participated in individual interviews 
and group discussions, as did Juntos local promoters, teachers, and health workers. 
 
 
5  Young Lives used a sentinel site sampling approach, which consisted of a multistage sampling procedure, whereby 20 
sentinel sites per study country were selected non-randomly, and then 100 households within a sentinel site were chosen 
randomly. Young Lives used the 2000 poverty map of Peru’s 1,818 districts developed by Fondo Nacional de Compensación y 
Desarrollo Social (FONCODES, the National Fund for Development and Social Compensation) as the basis for selecting the 
sentinel sites. Poverty maps provide a ranking of all districts according to their poverty index, which is calculated from 
variables such as infant mortality rates, housing, enrolment rates, roads, and access to services. Young Lives then used a pro-
poor sampling approach to over-sample poor districts, which yielded approximately 75 per cent of sample sites considered as 
poor and 25 per cent as non-poor.  
6  The Young Lives household questionnaire in 2006 did not include a specific question on Juntos because the programme was 
relatively new. Nonetheless, I was able get an estimate of families participating in the programme by looking at a section of the 
questionnaire that explores whether a family receives money or goods from the government. 
7  The names of the province and the communities have been changed to guarantee anonymity and protect the confidentiality of 
the research participants. 
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4.2 The communities 
The district in which the research took place had a total population of approximately 16,000, 
of which 44 per cent were children under the age of 14 (INEI 2007a). Its overall population 
almost doubled between 1999 and 2007, which may be a result of the pacification process 
initiated by the Government during the 1990s. Informal conversations with community 
members during the fieldwork suggest that people are still returning to their lands after a 
massive exodus to the capital as a result of the internal political violence experienced 
between 1980 and 2000 (see section 2.2).  
Ayacucho was the region most affected by the internal conflict between so-called grupos 
terroristas (terrorist groups) and the Government forces, recording the highest percentage of 
victims (40 per cent) in the country. People in Huamanga district were particularly badly 
affected. As a result, Huamanga became the headquarters of Ayacucho’s Comité de 
Autodefensa (Self-defence Committee) created by former President Alberto Fujimori’s 
administration to fight Sendero Luminoso. Peasants in Huamanga decided to exchange their 
sickles for firearms so as to defend themselves against Sendero Luminoso. Even though the 
conflict in the area finished more than a decade ago, Huamanga remains as one of poorest 
districts in the country (INEI 2006). Around 94 per cent of the population has no access to 
electricity; 79 per cent has no water supply and another 59 per cent do not have sanitation 
services. Nearly half of the female population is illiterate (49 per cent), and 45 per cent of 
children under the age of 5 are malnourished. The Appendix provides a brief description of 
the three communities in Huamanga province where the fieldwork took place.  
4.3 The children and their families  
Participants in the study formed four broad groups: (i) a group of children aged 6 to 8 years 
old, hereafter referred as ‘younger group of children’; (ii) a group of children aged 9 to 14 
years old, referred as ‘older siblings’; (iii) a group of parents of the participant children; and 
(iv) a group of Juntos stakeholders which included local primary teachers, healthcare 
professionals and Juntos promoters. Table 1 describes the distribution of participants 
according to their location, gender and involvement in Juntos. 
Table 1. Distribution of participants by gender and participation in Juntos 
Children All Female Male Juntos Non-Juntos 
6–8 years old      
YL YC children (main study) 22 12 10 15 7 
Non-Young Lives children (pilot study) 9 3 6 4 5 
9–14 years old      
Older siblings 18 9 9 12 6 
Total 49 24 25 31 18 
 
Adults All Female Male Juntos Non-Juntos 
Young Lives parents 22 19 3 15 7 
Non-Young Lives parents (pilot study) 8 7 1 4 4 
Teachers 17 11 6 – – 
Health professionals 8 8 – – – 
Juntos coordinators & community 
promoters 
5 4 1 – – 
Total 60 49 11 19 11 
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The group of the younger children was composed of 31 children aged 6 to 8 years old. Nine 
of them were involved in the pilot study (2007) and 22 in the main study (2008). The children 
from the pilot study were from Vilcas and were not Young Lives children. All children in the 
main study were Young Lives Younger Cohort children: four were from Tara, 11 from Alamo 
and seven from Vilcas community. All children in Tara were attending first grade in the local 
primary school. In Alamo, one girl was still attending pre-school, eight were already in first 
grade of primary school and a boy and a girl were in second grade. Five children in Vilcas 
were in Grade 1 and one boy and one girl were already in the second year of primary 
education. All but two children spoke Quechua as their first language, with four of them being 
not fluent in Spanish.  
According to the Young Lives 2006 household survey, nine of the 22 children were ‘stunted’ 
(i.e., below the median height for their age and gender). Most children lived with both 
parents, with the exception of one girl whose father had recently died in an accident, and 
another three children whose parents had separated and who as a result were now living 
with their mothers. Four of the children in the pilot study were also living in female-headed 
households. Children lived with an average of six other people in the same household, with 
some living with as many as 13, including siblings, aunts and uncles, nephews and 
grandparents.  
The older group of children (9 to 14 years old) consisted of 18 siblings of Young Lives 
Younger Cohort children who participated in the main study. Most of them were still in 
primary school with the exception of one boy in Tara, one boy and two girls in Alamo, and 
two girls in Vilcas, who were attending secondary school.  
Thirty parents also participated in individual interviews and group discussions: eight non-
Young-Lives parents in the pilot study in 2007, and 22 in the main study in 2008. According 
to the Young Lives 2006 Household Questionnaire for Caregivers, 17 out of the 22 Young 
Lives families were ‘extremely poor’ when their monthly per capita income was compared to 
the poverty line used in the last national household survey (ENAHO 2006) administered by 
INEI. Therefore, the majority of families were far below the ‘minimum expenditure deemed 
necessary for an individual in order to obtain all the goods and services which satisfy his or 
her basic needs’ (INEI 2007b). Sixteen out of 22 households had no electricity; 20 had no 
sewage facilities; and seven had no access to safe drinking water. Most of the participants’ 
fathers had completed primary education and only eight of them had pursued higher 
education. In contrast, none of the mothers had completed primary school, and therefore, 
could not read or write. Most families were farmers who produced food only for their own 
consumption. Exceptions were found among the group of non-beneficiaries in Vilcas where 
one family ran a small restaurant, another had a small grocery shop, and a third one sold 
agricultural products in a local market.  
Finally, a total of 17 local teachers and headteachers were interviewed in the main study, 
along with eight healthcare professionals, two Juntos community promoters and three Juntos 
local coordinators.  
 
 
8  It was agreed to not involve Young Lives families at the pilot stage so as to avoid overloading research participants. 
9  Fieldwork was undertaken with two local assistants who acted as translators and ethnographic informants. They helped not only to 
translate, but also to interpret and understand some events. A female interpreter who had been a former Young Lives fieldworker 
assisted with the pilot study, and she was familiar with the sites and the research participants. For the main study, a male field 
assistant who was fluent in Quechua and Spanish and had previous research experience in the locality helped conduct the 
research. Both field assistants provided support in the search for families, acted as translators from Quechua to Spanish, assisted 
during group sessions with children and adults, and provided support during the preliminary analysis of data. 
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4.4 The methods 
As discussed, the purpose of the study was to understand how Juntos – a fairly new CCT 
aimed at reducing poverty – was experienced by children and their families in three rural 
communities in rural Peru. In particular, the study wanted to examine: (i) children’s and 
parents’ experiences of the services related to Juntos, such as the local school and 
healthcare centre; (ii) children’s and parents’ views of the Juntos design and its 
implementation; (iii) the implications of the programme in people’s everyday lives; and (iv) 
changes that children and their families would like to make to the programme. 
The study mainly draws on data gathered from children and adults using a combination of 
qualitative research methods. These methods included individual interviews, group 
discussions, well-being and community mapping, home- and school-based semi-structured 
observations and child-led photography. This use of diverse qualitative methods facilitated 
the elicitation of children’s views and feelings (see also Punch 2002). These data were then 
complemented with survey data gathered by Young Lives through its Household 
Questionnaire for Caregivers, which covers issues such as both children’s and caregivers’ 
background information, economic changes and livelihoods.  
The fieldwork was carried out in two stages, with a one-year gap separating them. The first 
stage was a two-month pilot study (May and June 2007) aimed at assessing the feasibility of 
the study and the second stage was the three-month main fieldwork (April to June 2008). 
Ethics approval for the study was received from the ethics committee of the Department of 
Early Childhood and Primary Education, Institute of Education, University of London, and 
from the ethics committee of the Instituto de Investigación Nutricional (Institute of Nutrition 
Research) in Peru. (For further details of Young Lives methods, ethics and approach to data 
analysis, see www.younglives.org.uk.) 
5. The implications of Juntos 
for children’s well-being  
This section starts by examining how families in the three communities viewed and 
experienced poverty and well-being. Then, it discusses the extent to which Juntos was 
perceived as a programme aimed at children. It also analyses some of the implications of the 
programme for children’s everyday lives, with a particular focus on their experiences of 
health, nutrition, schooling and other dimensions of well-being. It then explores some 
implications of the programme at both household and community levels and discusses the 
potential effects of Juntos on children.  
5.1 Poverty and well-being among Juntos and non-Juntos families  
As mentioned earlier, 79 out of 108 Young Lives Younger Cohort children and their families 
in Huamanga were identified as beneficiaries of Juntos according to the 2006 Young Lives 
Household Questionnaire for Caregivers. Around 80 per cent of these families had been in 
Juntos at least one year when survey data were collected by Young Lives in 2006. Since 
Juntos was constantly expanding, data from Young Lives were cross-checked with the 
2007/8 official lists of beneficiaries that were publicly available on internet before the main 
fieldwork study in 2008, and again at the local health facilities during the fieldwork.  
CHILDREN’S EXPERIENCES OF JUNTOS, A CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER SCHEME IN PERU 
 20 
This exercise revealed some discrepancies between the two sources. According to the 
2007/8 official lists of beneficiaries, there were 74 Young Lives families (Younger Cohort 
children) participating in Juntos at the time of the fieldwork (instead of 79 identified through 
the 2006 Young Lives Questionnaire). Some families may have been excluded from the 
programme sometime after 2006, but this could not be confirmed because the records of 
families who withdrew from Juntos were not publicly available. Other families may also have 
been ‘indirect’ beneficiaries; that is, they lived with a relative who was beneficiary of Juntos, 
but did not get the cash transfer directly. In either case, the official lists of beneficiaries 
suggest that these families had not received any cash transfer for more than two years, and 
for this reason they are considered here as ‘non-beneficiaries’. Table 2 presents the 
distribution of beneficiary and non-beneficiary families both within the Young Lives sample 
and my fieldwork sample. 
Table 2. Young Lives families and Juntos coverage in Huamanga district 
 Young Lives Younger Cohort 
sample in Huamanga district 
(2006) 
No. families in my study (2008) 
Beneficiaries of Juntos 79 19 
Non-beneficiaries of Juntos 27 12 
Total 106 31 
Further general information about Young Lives full sample of families in Huamanga district is 
provided in Table 3, according to their status of beneficiaries or non-beneficiaries of Juntos. 
This information was used to analyse how similar or different these two groups were.  
Table 3. Characteristics of Young Lives sample in Huamanga district (Younger 
Cohort) (n=108) 
 Beneficiaries 
(n=74) 
Non-beneficiaries 
(n=34) 
Female-headed households (%) 15 8 
Mother’s first language is Quechua (%) 97 91 
Wealth index* (2006) 0.25 0.34 
Mother’s years of education (mean) 2.24 4.18 
Number of children < 14 years (mean) 2.35 3.05 
Source: Young Lives Questionnaire for Caregivers 2006 
*The wealth index is used by Young Lives as a proxy for poverty. It uses information on assets of household possessions, thought 
to be indicative of wealth. It takes values between 0 and 1, whereby a higher value indicates a higher socio-economic status. 
As noted above, the percentage of female-headed, and Quechua-speaking households 
(including mothers and grandmothers) is higher among beneficiaries than among non-
beneficiaries, which seems to confirm the Juntos goal of giving priority to households with 
those characteristics. Levels of poverty are also higher for beneficiaries when compared with 
non-beneficiaries, and they perceive themselves as poorer. However, it is worth noting here 
that wealth indexes for both groups are very low, which means that both groups fall into the 
‘extremely poor’ category according to national standards. Educational levels for both groups 
of mothers are very low, but especially among beneficiaries. Contrary to what was expected, 
non-beneficiary households had on average more children under the age of 14 than 
beneficiary families.  
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In relation to subjective experiences of poverty and social exclusion the Young Lives 
questionnaire asked caregivers how they think they ‘are doing now’ and then how they see 
themselves in ‘four years time’. Fourteen out of 22 families believed their living conditions 
were ‘going to be better’, seven thought they were ‘going to be the same’ and only one family 
felt that their ‘situation is going to deteriorate’. Most people think that change can happen if 
they work harder (42 per cent), or get a paid job (25 per cent). Despite these positive 
attitudes towards the future, there are a number of things that should be considered among 
beneficiary families, such as reported feelings of shame, exclusion and discrimination. For 
example, 27 per cent of beneficiaries reported being ‘ashamed of their clothes’; whereas only 
9 per cent of non-beneficiaries did so. Also, more beneficiaries said that ‘people in the 
community look down at [them]’ (23 per cent) than non-beneficiaries (18 per cent).  
In relation to the services provided in their communities, a higher proportion of beneficiaries 
(15 per cent) were unhappy with the services provided at the local health centre than non-
beneficiaries (around 7 per cent); 42 per cent were also dissatisfied with the role of the police 
compared to 24 per cent of non-beneficiaries; and most worrisome of all, less than half of the 
beneficiaries agreed with the following statement: ‘people in my community can influence 
important decisions of the local Government’ – against 62 per cent non-beneficiaries.  
5.2 The effects of Juntos on children’s well-being  
First, I wanted to explore the extent to which Juntos was perceived as a programme for 
children. Both beneficiary and non-beneficiary children and their parents found it difficult to 
explain the overall purpose of the programme. Some said the programme aimed to help 
‘poor families with loads of children’ (a misperception, because large families do not receive 
more cash than smaller families), while others highlighted the role of Juntos in supporting 
children’s nutrition and education. Contrary to what I expected, most beneficiary women 
found it difficult to identify Juntos conditions. Their responses were varied and ranged from 
having to ‘sweep streets’, and ‘clean the church hall’ to ‘taking children to the health centre’, 
and having to ‘buy school materials for our children’.  
Children and their parents participated in group discussions where they shared their 
experiences of services related to Juntos, such as local schools and healthcare facilities. 
Within that context, children and parents talked about Juntos and whether they thought it was 
making a difference in people’s lives. Two major themes emerged from the group 
discussions: the need for increasing the visibility of children within Juntos; and the necessity 
of raising people’s awareness about the programme’s objectives, strategy and conditions.  
All children in the study were to some extent aware of the existence of Juntos. However, like 
their parents, children did not spontaneously associate the programme with being ‘for 
children’. When asked about services, programmes or places where children and families 
could get support, parents and children from both age groups did not mention Juntos as one 
of them. Their immediate responses were that there was ‘nothing available’ for them (boy, 9), 
‘nothing meant for children’ (boy, 13), or ‘there is no such thing in our community’ (girl, 12).  
When asked specifically about Juntos, most beneficiary children knew that the programme 
was giving money to their mothers; they even knew the exact amount of the transfer: 100 
nuevos soles. The children and adults interviewed, however, were less clear about the child-
specific conditions of the programme such as attending school and making regular visits to 
the local health centre. Most people interviewed said they did not have to do anything special 
for their children, as most of them saw the conditions relating to both education and health as 
something they had been doing before the programme started.  
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Both beneficiary and non-beneficiary children associated Juntos with a programme for 
‘mums’ rather than for children. Likewise, in all group sessions parents described Juntos as a 
‘programa para las señoras’ (programme for married women). Overall, children were less 
‘visible’ in people’s descriptions about the programme. This does not mean that Juntos did 
not have important implications for children’s lives, as will be discussed later. But, it highlights 
the need to better communicate the programme’s child-specific aims as these may help both 
Juntos coordinators and beneficiaries to be more sensitive to children’s well-being. As a 
nurse in Vilcas suggested: 
It is helping women more than children. Women are now getting better clothes and 
having their own crops … how much of this goes to children, we don’t know. At least 
parents are more aware of the importance of schooling and taking children to the health 
post … they know that if they don’t do it, they won’t get the money … so they’ll do it.  
Another aspect I wanted to explore was the kind of image of children and the approach to 
childhood that both basic service providers and Juntos coordinators had. The way we see 
people profoundly influences the way we treat them. In interviews with basic service 
providers and Juntos coordinators there was shared concern about children’s well-being. 
Most of them wanted to act in children’s best interests. But at the same time, children tended 
to be portrayed in their narratives either as the ‘cause of poverty’ for their families, or as 
‘victims’ of their families’ and communities’ lack of care, as the following quote illustrates: 
[They are poor] because they keep having children. We talk about these issues as well. 
More children, more poverty.  
(Juntos coordinator, Tara) 
The problem with parents in this district is that most of them do not care about their 
children’s health or education. They only want them to help in the fields. They keep 
having more children and do not look after them properly ... that’s why they remain poor.  
(Primary school teacher, Alamo) 
The children participating in the study did face a number of risks and vulnerabilities, but by 
attributing their circumstances to the failure of their families and communities Juntos may run 
the risk of not addressing other wider social, economic and political circumstances that also 
contribute to their situation, like aspects of inequality, social exclusion, discrimination, etc. 
This narrow understanding of children’s well-being may not only pathologise families and 
communities, but at the same time lessens the role and responsibility of the state for people’s 
welfare.  
5.2.1 Health and nutrition 
When asked about the effects of Juntos, both the younger group of children (aged 6 to 8 
years) and their older siblings said the programme was having a positive impact on their 
families’ economic and food security. Some children said that they now ‘get more food’ and 
that their mothers were ‘using the money to improve the house’ or ‘buy[ing] more materials 
for school’ as shown in the interview extract below:  
Interviewer: Do you think Juntos is making any difference in families’ lives? 
Boy 1: Yes, we are better off now.  
Interviewer: How come?  
Boy 1: In the money, food, and clothes too.  
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Boy 2: My mum buys me clothes, and for herself as well. She also bought for my 
dad. She buys food too, such as grapes, fruit, peaches. 
Boy 1: Yes, fruit, and chicken to kill [and eat]. Things to store as well [in 
cupboards].  
(Beneficiary children, 6 and 7 years old, Alamo) 
Children were also invited to discuss what they thought mothers did with the money given by 
Juntos and explore how the subsidy was spent within the household. Consistently, 
beneficiary children in the three sites said that their mothers used the money to ‘cook’, or to 
buy food items like milk, fruit and other things that they cannot produce themselves, and 
used them to ‘feed their children’. The following interview extract from a beneficiary child 
illustrates this: 
Interviewer: And what do mums do with the cash?  
Boy: They buy meat, milk and cheese. 
Interviewer: For whom? 
Boy: For all of us. We eat. Sometimes she brings fruit for us to eat, to feed us. 
Cheese as well. There is no cheese here [in Tara], that’s why she goes there 
[to Ayacucho]. … Sometimes we have cheese here, but we only have a 
small cow and it gives little milk, so we only drink it. 
(Beneficiary child, 9 years old, Tara) 
Children, however, also highlighted that even when their families were getting more food 
items, these might not be equally distributed among different members within the household. 
For example, a beneficiary girl pointed out that she always keeps ‘part of [her] food for [her] 
grandma who comes in tired from working in the fields’, while another beneficiary girl said 
‘money [from Juntos] goes quickly and there is nothing left after spending it on only a few 
food items, because I live with my four siblings and my grandparents, who also eat’.  
5.2.2 Education and schooling 
Interviews with children, their parents and teachers also suggest that Juntos is having a 
positive effect on school enrolment and engagement with school. For example, a 6-year-old 
beneficiary girl explained: ‘My mum is now making [me] read and study more [and] I’ve now 
got all my school materials to do homework’. Since the programme ‘punishes’ (as some 
participants put it) those families who do not send their children to school regularly, the 
majority of families in the area seem to be taking more interest in education. According to a 
father, ‘we didn’t send them before [to school] … we didn’t see the value … we sent them to 
the fields to help us instead’. 
In particular, since Juntos started, more children with special needs or with either physical or 
cognitive disabilities are being taken to school. This is having a positive impact on the 
children and their families, as the former can now benefit from schooling and the company of 
peers, and the latter spend less time caring for them and can go to work outside the house in 
the fields or in the city. However, at the same time, teachers complained that they were not 
properly trained for these special cases, nor did they have the appropriate educational 
material. Therefore, the extent to which these children are benefiting from formal schooling 
remains uncertain. As a result of this, some children with special needs are experiencing 
social exclusion and violence within the school setting, as explained by one of the mothers 
whose 13-year-old son is deaf and cannot talk:  
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It is good that he goes to school. I didn’t send him before, because they didn’t want to 
take him. Now with Juntos, all children have to be in schools. But now he cries every time 
he has to go … The boy next door told me that children tease him during break and that 
his teacher beats him when he doesn’t stay quiet.  
(Beneficiary mother, Alamo) 
Both children and parents mentioned other difficulties related to schooling, such as low-
quality teaching and poor facilities. Most of the parents interviewed felt they could do little to 
help their children with school work as they did not feel prepared and did not have enough 
time. Children also said they would like to have access to a library or places where they 
could do their homework and learn new things. Parents and children also mentioned the 
difficulties that most children in the area have with continuing their education beyond primary 
school. Most of them have to travel long distances to secondary schools – as it is the case in 
Tara and Alamo. Children usually spend hours on the roadside waiting for public buses to 
take them to school because these prefer to pick up adult passengers, whose fare is nearly 
five times higher. Parents also expressed concerns about the future of their children once 
they have finished school, as there are few jobs available in the area. They feel their only 
chance would be to send their children to urban areas. This, however, would be too costly for 
families without relatives or social networks in these areas.  
As discussed earlier in this paper, CCTs are very effective in getting and keeping children in 
school. These programmes however, do not normally address other aspects of children’s 
education such the quality of schooling, their everyday experiences of school, and entry to 
the labour market. All these issues were in fact identified by both adults and children as 
major concerns in relation to education in the area.  
5.2.3 Other aspects of children’s well-being  
In general terms, parents valued Juntos intervention in health and education, but they would 
also like the Government to address other child-specific vulnerabilities that they identified 
during group discussions, such as children’s health, the prevalence of respiratory diseases, 
high levels of malnutrition, children’s experiences of violence within the family, school and 
community, and the impact of environmental shocks (e.g. hail and frost) on children, among 
other things. Even though Juntos aims to provide support to families with children, most of 
the parents who participated in my study felt they could not get any assistance from the 
programme when in need. It is not expected that Juntos will be responsible for all problems 
faced by children and parents, but perhaps the programme should be part of a more sound 
social protection system, therefore complemented by child-specific services and programmes 
where parents could be referred when needed.  
In particular, parents said they would like Juntos to be more aware of children and families in 
special circumstances. For example, one of the participant families, who had a child with a 
physical disability, reported that the cash transfer was not enough. Their child was now 
attending mainstream education, but was not necessarily getting the attention and care she 
required. They needed a specialised school, as well as access to specialised healthcare 
which is not available in the communities studied and would be extremely costly to get in the 
nearby city. Also, during group discussions in Tara, women commented that there were a few 
‘grandparents’ who were looking after their grandchildren, and for them it was more difficult to 
comply with certain conditionalities. Likewise, according to a group of non-beneficiary parents 
in Vilcas, Juntos is not always reaching the most vulnerable. For example, they mentioned 
the case of elderly people who are getting a pension from the Government. If the amount of 
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money exceeds 100 nuevos soles they are not entitled to receive the cash transfer, 
regardless of the number of children they are looking after.  
Both individual and group discussions with children and parents revealed uncertainty about 
how long Juntos would last. Apparently, families have not been informed when the 
programme will end, which raises important questions in relation to its sustainability. Some 
families said that they would like to start a business so as to improve their living conditions. 
But so far, beneficiary families are not being supported to develop strategies that could last 
beyond Juntos. According to one of the beneficiary children, this is what would happen if 
Juntos finishes, or when they ‘graduate’ from the programme, whichever comes first: 
Interviewer: What would happen if Juntos did not give money to mums any more? 
Boy: They won’t receive it any more, and its little house [referring to Juntos office] 
would not be there any more and they [mothers] would ask, ‘Where have 
they gone?’… and their plants [crops] will dry out, there would not be water 
to irrigate their plants.  
(Beneficiary child, 6 years old, Alamo) 
All these may have important implications for children, especially those who are in their 
transition to secondary school when their families ‘graduate’ from the programme. Also, 
during group activities most children said they would like to continue their studies and 
become ‘professionals’, but said their families are worried about what would happen after 
they finish primary school (presumably because of transport difficulties, as well as perhaps 
the labour market and future job opportunities).  
5.3 Effects at the household level  
As noted in previous studies, Juntos has several implications of Juntos for family 
relationships (Jones et al. 2007; IEP 2009; Vargas 2010). In this paper, I focus on the two 
aspects that were most mentioned by both parents and children; that is, women’s roles and 
gender dynamics, and intra- and inter-household allocation of resources and care. Of course 
these aspects are not entirely consequences of Juntos, but the findings suggest that the 
programme may be having important implications at these levels, and should therefore 
consider them in their design and implementation.  
5.3.1 Women and gender roles 
My findings suggest that Juntos is indeed having a positive impact on women’s self-image. 
Most of the beneficiary women interviewed reported feeling more valued within their 
households and being more confident about their labour and capacity to run small-scale 
businesses, and therefore, to contribute to their household economy. Even non-beneficiary 
families reported changes in beneficiary women’s behaviour and image: beneficiary women 
were described as wearing ‘better clothes and shoes’, and showing a more ‘confident’ look 
and behaviour and being more achoradas (daring).  
This new attitude among beneficiary women seems to be having effects on their relationships 
with their partners. In some cases, these implications were positive as women were gaining 
more power in decision-making in the household (see also Jones et al. 2007; Vargas 2010). 
But in other cases, the findings suggest that this change in women’s attitude and behaviour 
challenged gender-based traditional roles, and may therefore have caused conflicts at a 
domestic level, as illustrated in the following quote: 
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Well, my ‘señora’ [wife] has her money now and we use it to buy things for the family and 
the house. It is not much, but it is good. She also has to attend meetings and sometimes 
help at the municipality or health centre. … Sometimes I come back home and she’s 
gone … she used to have dinner ready, but now she does other things … sometimes 
she goes and chats with other ladies … I get home tired and I want a warm meal … 
that’s the only thing I don’t like … that she’s not there all the time. 
(Beneficiary father, Tara)  
Even though Juntos is contributing towards increased inclusion and participation of women in 
family and public life, the data analysed for this paper suggest that there is still much to be 
done in order to achieve a more equal distribution of gender roles at both levels and greater 
representation of women in public life. For example, interviews and observations with parents 
revealed that the design of Juntos is still based on a ‘traditional’ concept of family, where the 
men provide the main income and women look after the well-being of children and other 
members of the family. Almost all fathers interviewed were less aware of the overall purpose 
of the programme as well as the responsibilities that beneficiaries have to undertake in order 
to get the cash transfer, as is exemplified by this interview extract: 
Father: Mmm … don’t know really … I think my wife attends some meetings with 
other women in the community. The children also go to school. 
Interviewer: Do you know what these meetings are about? 
Father: No idea … I think they teach women how to feed their children and that sort 
of thing, but I can’t really tell … I’ve never attended one. 
Interviewer: Do you know of any father attending these meetings? 
Father: No, I don’t know of anyone here. We have to work, you know? We can’t go 
to the meetings because we need to be in the fields or working, you know? 
That’s why women are there. 
(Beneficiary father, Alamo) 
This suggests that despite the aim of Juntos to empower women within the family, the way it 
is designed and implemented may run the risk of reinforcing traditional models of care, where 
it is the role of women to look after the family, leaving men aside. Therefore, the programme 
may be reinforcing asymmetrical gender roles by not including fathers as much as mothers 
(see also Molyneux 2009 for similar findings on Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico).  
The changes in women’s self-image and roles described above have also had important 
effects upon children, girls in particular. For example, during group activities with children in 
Alamo, three girls drew themselves ‘growing plants like my mum’, ‘looking after guinea pigs 
and chickens, like [my] mum does’ or ‘having [my] own shop’. These examples suggest that 
girls are witnessing important changes in gender roles as more women are getting involved 
in productive tasks. This was also highlighted by one of the boys: 
Interviewer: And how was it before Juntos started?  
Boy:  We were not well, we were secos [dried out] … there was no money. Now 
it’s getting better. They [mothers] are planting their things. Mums are now 
growing their own plants and some sell them, others eat them. 
Interviewer: How was it before? 
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Boy:  They were staying at home, they were sad because they didn’t have their 
animals or little plants. 
(Beneficiary child, 6 years old, Alamo)  
5.3.2 Intra- and inter-household allocation of resources and care 
Other aspects to consider are the differences in the way material and economic resources, 
as well as time and care, are distributed within households. Even though children reported 
positive outcomes of the programme such as their families’ having more money to buy 
livestock, food and school materials, they also reported differences between themselves and 
their siblings in terms of access to the benefits provided by Juntos. For example, a group of 
boys claimed that their sisters were getting more clothes and school uniforms. This was also 
reported by one of the beneficiary mothers interviewed: 
Well, the girls need more clothes … their skirts, blouses, shoes, things for their hair … 
you know, Miss, girls need to look good. With the boys it is fine … they don’t care that 
much … but girls want to wear better clothes, so I have to buy my daughter more clothes 
than my sons. 
(Beneficiary mother, Alamo) 
Children also reported that ‘pressures’ and ‘demands’ are different. For example, an 8-year-
old girl said that her mum now puts a lot more pressure on her to perform well in school: ‘She 
gets upset if I don’t do my homework or if I lose my pencils or rubber … if I don’t have 
everything in order, my teacher shouts at me and then my mum gets upset and punishes 
me.’ Another boy said that his mum ‘gets really upset when [he doesn’t] help [his] younger 
brother with school work’. A group of girls in Alamo said that they like doing homework, but 
that now they have less time to play and hang out with friends. In group discussions with 
parents, some mothers explained that they now worry more about homework and school 
materials, because they can miss out on payments from Juntos if teachers report it to the 
programme coordinators.  
Similarly, interviews with parents revealed that the distribution of chores and work may have 
also changed within the household so as to free up the children who are required to attend 
school. This can also have implications for children’s and young people’s migration. As is 
already known, it is not unusual for children to migrate to urban areas after they finish 
primary school, to continue their education or to get a job. According to a beneficiary mother 
in Alamo, they have decided not to send their older daughter to live with her grandmother in 
the nearby city – as they did with their older son – because they need her to look after her 
younger siblings and help them with their homework: 
If the children don’t do well, we will get punished [will not get the cash] … and we 
[parents] cannot help them with homework … we don’t know what to do. My daughter 
can help. She’s very good. 
(Beneficiary mother, Alamo) 
Finally, another emerging theme was care networks, which can help to shed light on ways in 
which families try to ameliorate poverty and manage vulnerability, and on the complexity of 
resource flows and distribution. In particular, the analysis of data revealed children’s and 
women’s movement between urban and rural areas, and across different households. For 
example, the three Juntos coordinators explained that some families have moved back to 
their place of origin after living in urban areas. One mother told us: 
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Some families are coming back now … we heard about the programme and that it was 
helping families … so we came back. My sister has done the same. She doesn’t have a 
husband … she’s now living with my mum.  
(Beneficiary mother, Alamo) 
In some cases, women have moved in with their parents, in-laws or other relatives in order to 
be eligible to apply to access Juntos. Interviews with Juntos coordinators confirmed this 
trend. They said that some families had even decided to live apart – husbands in one place 
and the women with the children in another place. In other instances, the children were sent 
off to live with older relatives who lived in rural towns covered by Juntos. According to one 6-
year-old girl in Vilcas, ‘some families appear with someone else’s child’ so as to fulfil the 
Juntos selection criteria. Some families are sharing the benefits with their extended family. 
For example, in Alamo there was a household with 13 different members of the same family, 
including a mother and her two daughters, who had their own young children. The daughters 
said they all moved in together so they could take care of their mother who cannot work any 
more, and therefore they share the benefits with her. All this is having significant effects on 
children as they are not only changing location but in some cases experiencing new family 
settings.  
5.4 Effects at the community level  
This sub-section presents both positive and some ‘unintended’ negative effects of the 
programme upon community-level relationships and dynamics.  
5.4.1 Targeting and social tensions 
At the start of the programme the targeting process created some tensions at the community 
level. Participants in the communities visited expressed their confusion and disappointment 
about the targeting process and the selection of beneficiary families, which affected 
relationships as well as collective action and reciprocity between members of the community. 
During the pilot study carried out in 2007 in Vilcas, non-beneficiary families complained that 
the programme was supporting both ‘poor’ people and those who were ‘not so poor’. A non-
beneficiary mother said that some families who were not receiving subsidies from Juntos are 
feeling upset:  
When we saw for the very first time that some families were receiving it [an allowance 
from Juntos], we cried. I do not care any more. I am used to it now.  
(Non-beneficiary mother, Vilcas) 
Non-beneficiary parents said there had been targeting errors, and suggested that some 
families had not been appropriately assessed during the census and as a result were left out. 
In group discussions, non-beneficiary mothers argued that they had been ‘too honest’ when 
the census took place in their communities. When the surveyors asked if they lived with their 
partners, or if they had their own business or whether they had a TV, DVD, fridge, etc., these 
mothers gave honest answers. As a result of this, some non-beneficiary mothers suggested 
that the programme benefited only the mentirosas [dishonest women or liars]. These non-
beneficiaries felt upset because they saw other people such as ‘the wife of a municipality 
worker’ receiving money from Juntos. This unclear pattern in the selection of beneficiary 
families generated confusion and upset families in general, and non-beneficiary families in 
particular. 
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The findings suggest that despite Juntos efforts to improve its targeting strategy, most 
families did not understand the criteria used to select beneficiaries. As discussed earlier, data 
from both my qualitative study and Young Lives’ 2006 survey show that poverty in the 
communities studied is so widespread that it is very difficult to draw a line between the ‘poor’ 
and the ‘non-poor’. Therefore, the way Juntos measures and assesses poverty may have 
limitations in these communities, especially as these measurements may exclude ‘poor’ 
people who live on just a little more than others.  
5.4.2 Fears and distrust  
Most parents, including beneficiaries, were unsure about Juntos management, that is, 
whether it was a government programme or run by an NGO or a private institution. This 
uncertainty about the origins and purpose of the programme generated mixed responses 
among different members of the community, parents in particular. For example, in group 
discussions and individual interviews, parents from the three research sites expressed fears 
that the programme’s staff might take their children away from them. For example, a mother 
in Alamo asked whether Juntos was taking beneficiary children away from their families to 
make them study and live in Lima, while another woman in Tara said there were rumours that 
‘the programme was investing in their children only to give them for adoption to foreigners’.  
During an individual interview, a mother in Alamo expressed her fears about the real intention 
of the programme, as illustrated in the following quote:  
There are rumours you know? Some people here say that we shouldn’t allow our children 
to take part in Juntos. They say they are going to take them away … why do they want to 
pay for our children? We don’t understand … 
(Beneficiary mother, Alamo) 
These fears were not exclusively related to Juntos (see Morrow 2009 for similar experiences 
within Young Lives research). When asked about the reasons behind these fears, a Juntos 
promoter in Alamo explained: 
Oh, yes, there have been rumours like this. Apparently is due to their religion 
[evangelical Christian] or cultural beliefs. At the start of the programme we went to a 
remote community and they told us that they sent away the person who did the 
household census. They viewed Juntos as sent by the devil, as something that would 
take their children away. There was a complete refusal there. We first went to the health 
centre in order to explain the purpose of the programme but they did not want to meet 
us. People said they did not want anything from us. I told them not to complain later on. 
There was a group who wanted to participate but there was another more aggressive 
group who wanted us to get out of there. They made out that the programme was 
something evil. People here have always had that fear of strangers taking their children 
away. When they see people from other places they always feel the same.  
(Juntos promoter, Tara)  
These fears can be understood in relation to ancient local myths about indigenous people 
being abducted, and murdered by so called pishtacos, which can be traced back to the 
earliest years of Spanish colonisation. Pishtacos were Spanish conquerors and missionaries 
who, it was rumoured, wanted the ‘fat’ of native people for all kinds of purposes (Vasquez del 
Aguila 2007). Today, these fears appear to have been extended to any ‘white’, ‘urban’ person 
from outside the community.  
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5.4.3 Strengthening social exchange and reciprocity  
Despite all this, Juntos has also contributed to strengthening relationships between different 
members of the community. Beneficiaries are now more involved in decision-making, and 
participate more in activities organised by the communities. The following is an example of 
community redistribution, though it is not clear whether beneficiaries had a choice in the 
matter:  
The other day there was an activity organised by the council and we all attended. Juntos 
families gave an extra 1.00 nuevo sol so that everyone could get drinks and potatoes. In 
the health post as well, they asked us to give extra 0.20 nuevos soles to buy folders for 
everyone ... so now all families have their documents organised. 
(Beneficiary mother, Alamo) 
Yeah, we sometimes lend other children our pencils and rubbers. My mum says that we 
should help those who have less, and the teacher as well.  
(Beneficiary girl, 9 years old, Alamo) 
According to the Juntos coordinator in Vilcas, some families have also decided to become 
‘business partners’. For example, two families have started a trout farm business and each of 
them gave a share of their monthly cash transfer to start the business and are now splitting 
the profits. Another family bought chickens and cattle together and they are taking turns in 
looking after them. Also, interviews with parents revealed that some mothers are helping 
each other by looking after their children in shifts, so that everyone can attend meetings and 
spend time working in the fields.  
These examples of reciprocity and mutual collaboration were mainly seen in Alamo and Tara, 
whereas in Vilcas people reported more tensions and discontent between beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries. In terms of the history of Vilcas, this village was the most affected of the 
three by the internal conflict during the 1980s and 1990s, and also had the highest number of 
displaced people, who only recently started to come back (see section 2.2 above). Tara and 
Alamo, on the other hand, are more rural, were less affected by violence and seem to hold 
more powerful values of reciprocity and mutual collaboration.  
This highlights the need for Juntos to address the particular vulnerabilities faced by 
populations that were badly affected by political violence and displacement. This is 
particularly the case in contexts where relations between the state and citizens are still fragile 
and where conflicts have arisen from social divisions. CCTs like Juntos can help rebuild the 
trust between service providers, the state and the people, but they need to pay careful 
attention to the community context and social dynamics (Holmes 2009).  
5.5 Juntos approach to welfare  
One of the aims of the group discussions with teachers, healthcare professionals and local 
coordinators of Juntos was to analyse the ideas and perceptions of household poverty and 
welfare that were behind the design of the programme as well as in its everyday 
implementation. The main purpose here was to explore the extent to which Juntos was 
shaping children’s and families’ own views and experiences of well-being. 
5.5.1 ‘Cleanliness’ and ‘neatness’ 
Overall, Juntos was described by the research participants not only as a monetary support 
for ‘poor’ families but also as designed to ‘teach’ families how to live what they perceived as 
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‘a better life’. For example, teachers and healthcare staff interviewed said the programme 
was meant ‘para que mejoren’ (to make people improve) or ‘para que no sean ociosos’ (to 
stop them being lazy). Most people interviewed, including beneficiary families, saw the 
conditions attached to the programme – e.g. schooling and health check-ups – as a way of 
encouraging people to follow better and healthier lifestyles. In particular, they highlighted the 
role of Juntos in making them more ‘responsible’ towards their children’s well-being, and in 
teaching families good hygiene habits such as keeping themselves ‘clean’ and well-dressed, 
and their houses ‘tidy’ and ‘neat’.  
Phrases like ‘we want them [beneficiaries] to look tidier and cleaner’, and learn ‘values and 
life skills’ such as ‘being punctual’, ‘keeping your word’, ‘being affectionate with their children’ 
were common during interviews with Juntos coordinators and basic service providers. A 
group of teachers in Vilcas and Alamo said they wanted children to ‘stop being so submissive 
and be more proactive like leaders’.  
Interviewer: What would be your ideal view of beneficiary children? What would you like 
them to achieve? 
s: Their values, for example. I would like them to learn more values. They 
should not be selfish. They should learn values like friendship, goodness, 
etc. … Mums here are a bit cold. I talk to them a lot because some mothers 
don’t even know when their child’s birthday is. I tell them to show love to 
their children so I make them memorise their children’s birthdays. They 
don’t even know that. And what do they do for their birthdays? Nothing. I tell 
them ‘but you should give your child a big hug, say something nice to them’. 
Now it is improving … there are some mums who are doing it.  
(Juntos coordinator, Alamo) 
Children used phrases such as ‘they look dirty’ to refer to children from rural and remote 
areas. During group activities, children discussed differences between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries in relation to whether a child had had his/her vaccinations or not or had pencils 
and a rubber or not. According to teachers, some children are using similar comparisons to 
single out children who are not beneficiaries or those who were not complying with the 
programme’s conditions. In this case, specific aspects of well-being were used to label and 
mark differences between some children.  
A similar approach was seen towards women. Basic service providers said that Juntos was 
affecting not only the way beneficiaries ‘look’, but also other people in the community. 
Apparently, Juntos families were looking ‘cleaner and tidier’, which was making others in the 
community copy that model. During a community parade, beneficiary women were invited to 
march wearing a Juntos T-shirt and holding the Peruvian flag, in what appeared to be a 
display of discipline and discipline.  
As the result of their everyday interaction with families in the area, local promoters in the 
three communities studied came up with the idea of teaching families to carry out what they 
called ‘productive tasks’. During their home visits as well as in training workshops, some 
promoters encouraged beneficiary families to invest part of the monthly cash transfer in what 
they called ‘productive activities’, which ranged from making ‘home-made jam’ and ‘knitting 
and sewing’ things to sell in the local market, to animal husbandry (e.g. chickens, pigs, goats, 
cows and most of all guinea pigs), and small-scale agricultural activities.  
Also, local promoters of Juntos asked beneficiary families to implement so-called cocinas 
mejoradas (improved kitchens), which consists of building kitchen cupboards where families 
CHILDREN’S EXPERIENCES OF JUNTOS, A CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER SCHEME IN PERU 
 32 
can store pans and plates above ground level, avoiding contact with germs and dirt. Families 
are also asked to build chimneys to prevent the smoke from the stove entering the house, 
and galpones (hutches for guinea pigs), which prevented the animals from running around 
the kitchen floors.  
Although most of these actions are having a positive impact on families, these requests were 
not part of the conditions agreed in the original contract signed by beneficiary families. 
Promoters were therefore including ‘new conditions’, which in most cases reflected their own 
ideas of what they considered important for families’ well-being in the area. Undoubtedly, 
most of these ‘new conditions’ were well intended and benefited a number of families, as 
confirmed during interviews with parents and children and illustrated by the following 
interview extract:  
Interviewer: Have you ever heard of a programme/place called Juntos? 
Boy: Yes, Madam. 
Interviewer: What have you heard about it?  
Boy: To avoid the smoke, we make cocinas mejoradas [improved kitchens].  
Interviewer: How does that work?  
Boy: We get the smoke out with a pipe. 
Interviewer: And is that better?  
Boy: Yes. 
Interviewer: How come? 
Boy: We don’t smell [breathe] it.  
Interviewer: What else does Juntos do?  
Boy: There is an assembly where they tell them [the beneficiaries] things. They 
go there … for us to get cleaned, to meet school requirements [para que 
cumplimos en la escuela].  
Interviewer: What happens if people don’t ‘get clean’? 
Boy: When we are dirty [cochinos], it pollutes [contamina] us.  
Interviewer: And what happens if they don’t send their children to school?  
Boy: They don’t receive it [the cash] any more. They get punished, they don’t 
give the money. 
 (Beneficiary child, 9 years old, Tara) 
The main concern around these added conditions is one of ethics and respect. The three 
Juntos promoters interviewed were former ‘health promoters’ who worked on behalf of the 
Ministry of Health at a community level in different parts of the country. They themselves said 
that Juntos – and its conditions in particular – had made a ‘real impact on the implementation 
of social programmes, because people now obey and participate more than ever before’ 
(Juntos coordinator). The problem with these ‘new conditions’ is that they are not just causing 
confusion among beneficiaries about what the real conditions of the programme are, but they 
are also giving local promoters a new sense of power and control over local people. It is 
giving them ‘the power to change people’s attitudes’, as one of the promoters interviewed put 
it. This seems to be something they had wanted to achieve for a long time:  
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They don’t have anything. They are poor and they need to feed their children. I think it is 
up to the promoter to teach them. We cannot change them all, but maybe some of them 
will get out of poverty. Perhaps they listen to us more because of the money. Maybe they 
would do anything we ask because otherwise Juntos will punish them. Therefore, we 
have the opportunity to teach them, to show them more things. I think that it is in this way 
that they are going to change themselves. This is what we want. 
(Juntos coordinator, Vilcas) 
Another problem is that these ‘new conditions’ may not reflect people’s actual needs, but 
because they are seen as a condition to receive the cash transfer, most beneficiaries will do 
‘whatever they are asked to do’, as suggested by a local healthcare professional interviewed. 
For example, one of the promoters in Vilcas said that some families do build latrines when 
asked but they do not necessarily use them. During the fieldwork, some beneficiaries said 
they did not use the latrines because their children did not like them, they ‘smell bad’ and 
they are afraid of falling down the hole. These aspects of power and control between 
beneficiaries and service providers are discussed next. 
According to a group of non-beneficiary mothers, teachers have also become more exigent 
since Juntos started. They not only ask beneficiary parents to buy all school materials but 
also non-beneficiary families, even if they are considered ‘poor’. The latter complain that they 
do not always have enough resources to fulfil these new demands. Non-beneficiary mothers 
also claimed that their children were being singled out by teachers because they were not as 
clean and well dressed as their counterparts from Juntos. The following quotes illustrate 
some of this: 
They [the teachers] make us bring all the books and materials. We have to have 
everything complete; all school materials … even school uniforms … they should ask 
these things only of Juntos families, because they are getting extra money … we are not.  
(Non-beneficiary mother, Vilcas) 
Well, now he [her son] has to wear his uniform. They [teachers] no longer accept other 
clothes. For example, for physical education they’re asked to wear only white. He wears 
white trainers, socks, and T-shirt, and also blue shorts. They [the teachers] don’t want 
anything else. They are asking for more things than before; more pencils, notebooks, etc. 
They demand quite a lot  
(Beneficiary mother, Alamo) 
5.5.2 ‘Rights’ or ‘duties’: relationships with basic service providers 
Another level at which Juntos seems to be having an impact is on the relationships between 
the people and basic service providers. In both intended and unintended ways, CCT 
programmes are said to be changing accountability relationships between local service 
providers and poor households. These include the new CCT focus on ‘co-responsibilities’ 
between the state and citizens, whereby the state is thought to be lessening its paternalistic 
role by placing time limits on benefits, and requiring beneficiaries to comply with certain 
conditions. It is believed that by, for example, requiring families to take responsibility for 
schooling and health of their children, CCTs seek to foster a culture of co-responsibility 
between the Government and families, which may be key to fostering social inclusion (de la 
Brière and Rawlings 2006). 
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On the positive side, the findings show that more people are getting access to basic services 
such as health, nutrition and education. Also, Juntos engages with the population through 
consultative councils and via elected beneficiaries who serve as conduits between their 
communities and the programme providers. The downside of this is that these so-called 
‘community promoters’ are still being chosen by service providers themselves, and they do 
not necessarily fully understand their roles. It is more a kind of surveillance instead of two-
way communication channel. 
The findings also suggest that beneficiary families may be experiencing stigmatisation and 
discrimination by basic service providers. Beneficiary women, for example, were subject to 
regular monitoring to check whether they were fulfilling the conditions of the Juntos 
programme and, on some occasions, they have been publicly singled out for not complying. 
Some beneficiary women complained that Juntos coordinators ‘criticised’ them and used 
‘name and shame’ strategies at community meetings to make them comply with the 
programme’s demands, instead of showing them how to ‘improve their situation’. Similar 
practices have been experienced by beneficiary children in school, when their teachers 
increased their demands and asked them to have all their educational materials, finish their 
homework, and perform and behave well in the classroom. 
Both schools and health centres were to some extent ‘policing’ people for not following rules, 
sometimes making them feel embarrassed. The quote below exemplifies this: 
Sometimes we pick a classroom at random and check that beneficiary children have 
their notebooks, that they are clean and neat, that they have pencils, and that their books 
are covered in plastic wrap. We then keep records. The children know that and they try 
to get everything ready. Some of them get upset with their mums if they are caught out 
by Juntos for not having all their materials. 
(Juntos coordinator, Vilcas) 
Beneficiaries seem to be so concerned about being punished for not complying with the 
conditions and therefore losing the cash transfers, that they do not always tell the truth about 
their conditions. Perhaps they are afraid of consequences, or it may be a strategy to try to 
obtain further benefits. Even children seem to be afraid of the consequences, because at 
least two of them did not want to talk about Juntos. It seems that children have learned what 
to answer when they are asked about the benefits of the programme.  
This leads to another important implication of Juntos. The programme is supposed to be 
voluntary in all matters. Beneficiaries can decide whether they want to participate in the 
programme and comply with the conditions or not. However, interviews with both Juntos 
coordinators and parents revealed that this is not always the case. Participants feel 
compelled to attend all capacity-building workshops, and do whatever Juntos coordinators 
ask them to do; otherwise, they fear they will not get the monthly payment, which is of great 
value to them. The question here is what happens when the concept of ‘voluntary 
participation’ is attached to a necessity for survival? The programme seems to be relying on 
people’s need for survival to make them comply and behave in ways they consider 
appropriate and conducive to future human development (see research in relation to 
programmes in the USA and the UK , Dwyer 1998; Heron and Dwyer 1999; Gilliom 2001; 
Hays 2003; Dwyer 2004).  
Finally, it seems that beneficiaries are experiencing contradictory messages within the 
programme. For example, while they are told that they are expected to become independent 
and self-sufficient, they are also (implicitly) asked to be compliant and obedient to the 
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authorities. Beneficiaries are getting used to constant public supervision and to sometimes 
intrusive surveillance from Juntos. As discussed earlier, this surveillance is inherently an 
instrument of power, where Juntos stakeholders (i.e. local teachers, headteachers, 
healthcare professionals, Juntos community promoters and Juntos local coordinators) may 
use this power of surveillance to make judgements about beneficiaries’ behaviour and 
ultimately decide who ‘deserves’ and ‘does not deserve’ the cash transfer. Ultimately, this 
may leave children in a more vulnerable situation. 
6. Implications and 
conclusions 
A number of implications arise from the findings reported above. Like other CCTs, Juntos 
appears to be having beneficial effects on certain aspects of children’s well-being, such as 
physical health, nutrition and schooling. At the same time, however, there are limitations to 
these benefits, not least because Juntos cannot guarantee the quality and usefulness of 
government services that it obliges recipients to utilise. Given that a certain amount of 
stigmatisation seems to accompany recipient children and families, one might also ask 
questions about effects on other aspects of children’s well-being and development, such as 
individual self-esteem, gender-based notions and practices, cultural identity and relationships 
within the community.  
Taken together, the study findings offer insight into the design and delivery of Juntos. On the 
one hand, the programme holds a traditional view of women that places on them the entire 
responsibility for the household and children’s care, while men are scarcely involved. But the 
CCT then traps the women with expectations apparently not realistic for their situation. The 
overall image of children that Juntos was promoting at the time of the fieldwork reflected 
normative ideas about childhood and child development mainly coming from outside the 
community, perhaps even from industrialised countries. This is illustrated by failure to attend 
to the needs of grandparents and pensioners, who in much of the community are the ones 
often actually in charge of children. The programme associates normative childhood with 
dependency and nuclear family structures not commonly found, and schooling patterns not 
always readily accessible in the communities studied. This makes children and their families 
seem less ‘capable’, less ‘motivated’, and less ‘developed’. For this reason, teachers and 
Juntos promoters assumed that recipient children and their families needed constant 
monitoring and direction from them on how to behave and to meet their CCT obligations. 
Further, the findings could be interpreted to suggest that Juntos may have tried to use the 
programme’s conditions to change recipients’ attitudes and behaviour less to what was 
needed than to match professionalised assumptions and ideas of what kind of childhood and 
family life is normative. One suspects from the data that many children may in their relations 
with Juntos have to deal with unjustifiably narrow views of who they are and accept how 
others want them to live.  
The findings also suggest that a narrow view of childhood as potential human capital may 
induce Juntos to retain a rather traditional approach to childhood poverty in a situation in 
which more flexibility and innovation might have been helpful. An overemphasis on children’s 
future skills and contributions as adults diverts attention, as noted above, from present needs 
and experiences while they are still children. One could also question the assumption that 
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what is good for the household will automatically be good for children. Juntos, like other 
CCTs, is based on the notion that cash transfers to the family household, and access to 
education and healthcare for the children, are the main means to improve the living 
conditions of people in poverty. For all these reasons, if CCTs like Juntos are to become 
more ‘transformative’ by enhancing social equity and social rights of the people involved 
(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004) they need to go beyond just raising income and 
consumption standards of people living in poverty, as helpful and important as that is. These 
programmes could usefully take a rights-based approach that recognises the need for 
integrated, inter-sectoral approaches to child-related policies, which would help with the 
problem of CCTs as stand-alone programmes referring people to services that may be sub-
standard. Such an approach would involve gathering information that goes beyond health 
and education statistics, and includes data on child abuse and exploitation, as well as civil 
and political rights of children. It certainly would include systematic dialogue with both 
children and their families.  
To be more child-sensitive, CCTs need to consider children within the context of their 
relationships with their families and wider society (Ray and Carter 2007). Some of these 
children experience systematic and institutionalised exclusion, and for this reason, it is crucial 
to understand the roles of different actors and institutions in the lives of the children. CCTS 
that were more child-centred also would show more knowledge and awareness of child-
specific risks and incorporate different family models and structures, including grandparents, 
the extended family and child-headed households. They would also pay more attention to 
community history, backgrounds, and social cohesion and dynamics in order to minimise 
tensions and maximise people’s use of social networks. CCTs like Juntos need to combine 
their focus on individual households with community-level actions so as to strengthen mutual 
collaboration and sense of reciprocity, which is vital to most rural communities in the country. 
Finally, to be more child-sensitive, CCTs should build better links between child protection 
and broader social protection measures.  
In conclusion, Juntos appears to be based on a rather narrow approach to childhood poverty 
and well-being, in which children are mainly seen as indicators, and investments for the 
future. Second, further research is needed to improve knowledge and awareness of child-
specific risks and vulnerabilities – these may include the effects of environmental shocks; 
nutrition; violence within the household, school and community; social exclusion; and the 
sense of powerlessness that children and their families experience. Third, it would be realistic 
for Juntos to recognise that there are multiple family forms and structures of care 
(grandparental care, other relatives, child-headed households) instead of basing 
interventions upon the nuclear family norm. Fourth, closer attention needs to be paid in CCTs 
to community histories, backgrounds, social cohesion and dynamics in order to minimise 
potential conflict and tensions and to maximise people’s use of social networks. A combined 
focus on individual households and community-level actions would strengthen mutual 
collaboration and sense of reciprocity. Finally, a move away from the emphasis on 
beneficiaries’ ‘duties’ towards a view that respects people’s dignity and rights, together with a 
move away from ‘monitoring, policing and surveillance’ to an approach that emphasises 
inclusion, listening and working together would enhance Juntos.  
 
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  Appendix 
 Description of research sites 
 ALAMO TARA VILCAS 
Population Around 550 residents (51 per 
cent are children under 14). 
Around 350 (52 per cent are 
children under 14). 
Around 1,150 residents (49 per 
cent are children under 14). 
Living 
conditions 
Most families rely on 
agriculture (arable and 
livestock). A few families also 
provide services such as 
transportation, small family-
run restaurants and grocery 
stores. Most houses in Alamo 
are single-room and made of 
stones or adobe (mud) bricks 
with hay/straw roofs, or in a 
few cases, corrugated tin 
roofs. 
Characterised by its 
mountainous landscape and 
widely scattered dwellings. At 
these latitudes cold 
temperatures, frost and hail 
can strike 12 months a year, 
but particularly in June, July 
and August. These harsh 
weather conditions destroy 
potatoes and other crops in the 
area and pose a real threat to 
children’s nutrition and health. 
The overall economy in the 
area relies on agriculture and 
cattle-raising. Most people live 
in one-room houses made of 
stones with hay/straw roofs. 
Most families in Vilcas rely on 
agriculture, although some 
people work as daily labourers 
in Ayacucho city, while others 
are drivers, run small 
restaurants, or trade in the 
local markets. Vilcas is the 
best-served community in the 
whole of the district for basic 
services. It has a primary 
school, health centre with 
ambulance (open 24 hours), 
Catholic church, police station, 
a Juntos office that oversees 
the programme in Huamanga 
district, the municipality and 
Mayor’s office, and a district 
court. Most houses in the 
central square are built from 
brick, but less than 20 metres 
away the scene changes: 
roads become narrower and 
bumpier, and houses are 
smaller and made of large 
adobe blocks with corrugated 
tin roofs. 
Basic 
services 
Alamo has a Government 
primary school with seven 
teachers serving about 150 
students from grades 1 to 6. 
It had a pre-school but that 
closed after the fieldwork. 
Students have to attend 
secondary school either in 
Ayacucho city or in Vilcas. In 
2008 Juntos opened a small 
office in the community, 
which also serves Tara and 
other nearby villages. There 
is a health post in the 
community, which provides 
basic healthcare and 
nutritional supplements 
mainly for women and for 
children under the age of 5. 
For serious illness or injuries 
people need to travel to 
Ayacucho's public hospital. 
Tara has a Government 
multigrade primary school and 
a PRONOEI (non-formal pre-
school for children aged 3 to 5, 
run by local mothers but with 
some support from the Ministry 
of Education). In 2007, the 
school had three female 
teachers teaching all six 
grades in three classrooms. 
Enrolment rates have 
decreased in the last ten years. 
In 2008 the primary school had 
fewer than 20 children. There is 
no secondary school in the 
area. Children who want to 
continue their education after 
primary school need to travel to 
Ayacucho city or Vilcas (10 
km). The community does not 
have a health post. The nearest 
health facilities are a public 
hospital in Ayacucho city or the 
health centre in Alamo (6 km). 
The primary school in Vilcas 
was rebuilt during the 1990s 
and is sturdy and well 
constructed. In 2008, it had 14 
teachers and about 240 
students. Vilcas also has a 
secondary school, which also 
serves students from nearby 
communities such as Tara and 
Alamo. In 2008 this school had 
11 teachers and about 200 
students enrolled. There is also 
a pre-school. Even so, some 
people to send their children to 
study and live with relatives in 
Ayacucho city.  
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